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Secession From the European Union:




This Article examines the likelihood of secession from the Union and whether or not it legally
possible. It asks what process would have to be invoked and examines the role and function
of a European army in secession and whether such an army may be called upon to intervene to
prevent secession. This Article, finally, looks at the current proposals being discussed in regards
to reforming the Union.
SECESSION FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION:




Headline: "Union Troops today stormed the capitol building, forcing
the last rebel troops into an unconditional surrender. The secession-
ists have been roundly defeated."
One could apply that sort of headline to far too many inter-
nal State conflicts. It is also likely that one will continue to be
able to use that sort of headline for a long time to come. On a
"what if . . . ?" scenario, could those Union troops belong to
the European Union ("EU" or "Union"), and could the capitol
building refer to the Houses of Parliament in Westminster, the
Bundestag in Berlin, the Sejm in Poland? This Article seeks to
examine the legal issues that could lead to such a scenario.
One of the most fundamental questions, yet also one of the
most ignored within the EU, is whether the EU is the archetypal
cockroach motel: a motel where you can check in, but not
check out. In an era when most of the focus is on preparing for
a rapid and dramatic enlargement of the Union from fifteen
States to a potential of twenty-seven over the next ten years, little
has been said on the question of whether, once an applicant
State has joined the Union, it can subsequently leave, and if it
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can leave, under what legal process it may do so.' Yet an en-
largement of the nature envisaged, bringing as it does a radically
different set of cultural, political, legal, and economic values and
mores, may be more likely to give rise, in the not too distant
future, to the potential of a Member State seeking a renegoti-
ation of the relationship between that State and the Union, if
not complete withdrawal from the Union.
Without even looking at the new applicant States, such a
possibility has often been raised with respect to the United King-
dom.2 In recent times, individual members of the U.K. Parlia-
ment have tabled secession legislation, authorizing the govern-
ment to negotiate for withdrawal from the Union.3 The Iraq cri-
sis and the deep divisions between the United Kingdom, France,
and Germany also give cause for concern.4 As the Union moves
closer towards integration between States that have fundamen-
tally different global outlooks, the internal tensions that will nat-
urally arise may provide insurmountable problems to a Member
State. Furthermore, the United Kingdom cannot be singled out
as the only possible difficulty - the Iraq crisis has demonstrated
a split between the Franco-German monolith and other powers
such as Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom.5
1. Greenland did leave the Union in 1985 following the unanimous agreement of
the Member States to an amendment of the Treaties giving Greenland overseas coun-
tries and territories (hereinafter OCT) status. See Friedl Weiss, Greenland's Withdrawal
from the European Communities, 10 EUR. L. Rv. 173 (1985). However, the Greenland
situation is not fully analogous to the withdrawal of a full Member State, as Greenland is
effectively an overseas colony of Denmark. Id. at 173-74. In 1972 Greenland voted
against joining the European Union ("EU," the "Union," or EEC, as it was then), but
since Denmark voted to join, Greenland had little option but to follow. See id. at 176
(explaining that a majority of Danish voters opted for accession, but about 71% of
voters in Greenland voted against accession). Following substantial conferral of home
rule to the newly Greenland Parliament, a further referendum saw Greenland confirm
its desire to leave the EU. Id. at 175-76. In the interests of de-colonization, it was not
unsurprising that the other Member States conceded generous withdrawal terms. See
id. at 179-82 (discussing the terms of the EU's offer to Greenland).
2. The divergence with respect to foreign policy and the closer relationship be-
tween London and Washington, D.C., particularly over the situation in Iraq, neatly
demonstrates a divergence within Europe with respect to foreign affairs. See Iraq Rift
Overshadows EU Summit, BBC NEWS, May 5, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu-
rope/2951647.stm [hereinafter Iraq Rift].
3. See European Union (Implications of Withdrawal) Bill [H.L.], H.L. BILL 7 (Rev)
(2000).
4. See Iraq Rift, supra note 2.
5. See Europe and Iraq: Who Stands Where?, BBC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2003, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2698153.stm (stating that France, Germany,
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For new applicant States, the possibility of withdrawal is per-
haps even more likely, given the fluid nature of their economic
and social structures and the inherent ethnic tensions among
many of these States, some of which are artificial creations.6
Might a huge economic shock to the Union, perhaps from a vio-
lent conflagration in the Middle East, put intolerable strains on
the social fabric of many of these new applicant countries? Cer-
tainly in such a scenario, one can envisage the Union taking dra-
matic steps in terms of financial and material aid to avoid this
consequence, but imagine that it is all to no avail, or that the
price is simply too high - that it is a burden the Union is una-
ble, or unwilling, to undertake. Imagine then the unimaginable:
that Member State X seeks to withdraw from the Union.
There are a number of issues that arise in such a scenario.
First, how likely is secession from the Union? Second, if there is
a factual possibility of secession, is it legally possible? Third, if it
is legally possible, what process would have to be invoked?
Fourth, if secession rights of the States are limited, to what ex-
tent does this impact upon the role and function of a European
army, and could such an army be called upon to intervene to
prevent secession? Finally, in reforming the Union, what are the
current proposals being discussed, if any? This Article deals with
each of these points in turn.
I. IS SECESSION I[KEL Y?
One of the first arguments that must be disposed of, if this
Article is to provide anything more than an academic equivalent
of the "Twilight Zone," is whether the issue of secession7 could
Belgium, and Luxembourg are all opposed to the Iraq War); Dutch Debate Iraq Involve-
ment, BBC NEWS, Aug. 28, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/
3189921.stm (stating that the Netherlands has not sent troops to Iraq).
6. They are artificial creations at least in terms of lines on a map. Much is made of
the colonial powers to simply create new States in Africa and Asia by simply drawing
lines in the sand regardless of tribal loyalties or community rivalries. See generally L.H.
GANN & PETER DUIGAN, COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960 (1973);JOHN D. HARGREAVES,
WEST AFRICA PARTITIONED VOL. II: THE ELEPHANTS AND THE GRASS (1985); ROBIN
BROOKE-SMITH, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (1987). However, this is very much the Euro-
pean experience in their homeland as well. See NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE: A HISTORY
(1998).
7. While the term often used with respect to departure from the Union is "with-
drawal," this Article uses the term "secession." The difference is important: "With-
drawal" simply means "the act of retreating from a place, position, or situation." See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1594 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "withdrawal"). "Secession," on
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in any way become a reality within the Union. There is an old
Irish adage that talks about the dynamics of group associations.
The thrust of the adage is that having finally agreed to form a
group, the very first agenda item for the group is: the split. Al-
though Irish history is undoubtedly littered with such eventuali-
ties,8 it is hardly the case that somehow the Irish are indeed sub-
stantially more likely to "split" than any other grouping.
How likely is it that any of the Member States of the Union
would seek to withdraw from the Union? If the answer is excep-
tionally unlikely, then the issue of secession becomes a hypothet-
ical not worthy of analysis, similar to an argument about what
would happen if the sun did not come up tomorrow. However,
there are many telling portents that the potential of a State seek-
ing to withdraw from the Union is not merely likely but inevita-
the other hand, has particular political connotations: "the process or act of withdraw-
ing, esp. from a religious or political association." See id. at 1353 (defining "secession").
The use of "secession" therefore implies that the Union is a State, with all the relevant
emotional and political baggage that it entails. The use of the term secession is pre-
ferred throughout the Article for a variety of reasons. First, the Union does have legal
personality. See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 24, Oj. C
325/5, at 18-19 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 67 (ex Article J.14) [hereinafter Consolidated TEU],
incorporating changes made by Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Feb. 26,
2001, O.J. C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice] (amending Treaty on European
Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty es-
tablishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renum-
bering articles of TEU and EC Treaty). Furthermore, since it can hardly be described
as a corporation, this legal personality must be more analogous with that of a State.
Second, the term "withdrawal" does not accurately reflect the seriousness or difficulty
that the action would involve. Finally, the preference to use "withdrawal" is simply a
refusal to deal with the issue as to whether the Union is in fact a State in the accepted
sense of the word. However, the argument becomes circular: one way we could tell if
the Union is a State would be how difficult it is to leave the Union. Terminology on
leaving is not that which defines whether the Union is a State or not but rather how, if
at all, leaving is to be achieved. No prohibition on departure would indicate that the
Union is not a State as we currently understand that concept; prohibited or limited
departure would indicate it is far closer to a State than many recognize.
8. The foundation of the Irish State itself is a classic example. See generally OXFORD
COMPANION TO IRISH HISTORY (S.J. Connolly ed., 2002). First, there were those who
wanted to "split" from the United Kingdom. See id. at 542. Then, following negotia-
tions securing a twenty-six and not thirty-two county "split," those who fought the An-
glo-Irish War "split" into two groups, Sinn-F6in, which was for the Anglo-Irish treaty,
and the Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), which was against it. See id. at 16, 277. Over
time, the IRA again "split" into the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA. See id. at 284.
Even today, the Provisional IRA went on ceasefire, immediately causing a split into the
Real and Continuing IRA in 1995. See id.
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ble at some stage in the not-too-distant future. And those
portents come not merely from outside Europe but from within
Europe itself. Indeed a quick survey of European history is illus-
trative in that regard.
Within a European context, we need to look at the problem
of secession through a historical backdrop of an endemic lack of
constitutional, political, and legal constancy in the European
mainland.9 Political structures in Europe have not long endured
since the days of the Roman Empire.' ° France, for example, has
undergone one monarchy, one empire, and five republics.' 1
Further, its geographic borders have been similarly fluid.' 2 Eu-
ropean history is littered with failed groupings such as the Holy
Roman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prussia, and so
forth. And who remembers the Ottoman Empire?' 3 Europe has
seen the establishment of artificial States such as Belgium to
keep the warring factions opposed. 4 In the middle of the last
century, the stability of the Nation State has been severely jolted.
There was a serious proposal for Union between the United
Kingdom and France, previously sworn enemies, in the face of
Nazi Germany's wartime successes.15 After World War II, Europe
underwent the redrawing of physical borders and the creation of
new artificial States in a vain attempt to mask racial and ethnic
divides. 6 The collapse of Yugoslavia17 and the break up of
9. See ASA BRIGGS & PATRICIA CLARIN, MODERN EUROPE 1789-1989, at 1-9 (1997)
(describing the constancy of flux in Europe).
10. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at 15, 20 (describing ephemeral nature of Europe
since the fall of the Roman Empire).
11. See generally W. ScoTt HAINE, THE HISTORY OF FRANCE (2000).
12. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the historical practice of
political boundary lines in colonial Africa and also in Europe).
13. Today the Ottoman Empire is better known as Turkey. See generally HALIL IN-
ALCIK & DONALD QUATAERT, AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EM-
PIRE 1300-1914 (1994).
14. Belgium declared independence in 1830. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at 804
(describing creation of Belgian State).
15. See generally PETER STIRK & DAVID WEIGALL, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999); HENRY B. RYAN, THE VISION OF ANGLO AMERICA (1987)
(providing an alternative proposal for the union of the U.K and the United States).
16. See The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Con-
ference, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm (last visited
Dec. 20, 2003).
17. See generally CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, YUGOsLAVtA's BLOODY COLLAPSE: CAUSES,
COURSE AND CONSEQUENCES (1995).
2004] SECESSION FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
Czechoslovakia 8 are fairly recent examples of this doomed en-
terprise. The list could go on, but the point would remain the
same. In the European context, the one thing we can be certain
of is uncertainty itself.
A counter argument might be that the Union represents a
new departure from the history of Europe. Finally, or so the
claim goes, Europe has reached a point where it has learned
from the lessons that history has all too often taught with an un-
necessary degree of barbarism. Let us analyze this argument.
How stable is the Union today? Is it so stable that it can over-
come the experience of its history?
To answer this question we need to understand why federa-
tions fail, and why elements secede from a State. Sunstein postu-
lates that there are five principle reasons:19 first, repression or
substantial infringement of civil rights; 20 second, economic self-
interest;21 third, economic exploitation; 22 fourth, injustice in the
original acquisition;2 and finally, cultural and ethnic differ-
18. See generally THE END OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Jiri Musil ed., 1995).
19. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 654-
56 (1991) (arguing that an express constitutional right to secede is inappropriate and
that secession rights should generally not be recognized); but see K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 85-87 (4th ed. 1964) (arguing that a right to secede unilaterally is not
inconsistent with the federal principle).
20. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 655-59. Curiously, the Article suggests only the
former Soviet Union as a concrete example of where such infringements of basic civil
rights could be argued. See id. It seems that Sunstein views the infringement of civil
rights as more likely to take place generally across the federation than be confined to
any specific sub-unit such as a cultural or ethnic group. Perhaps the negative treatment
of Catholicism by the United Kingdom with respect to the Irish sub-unit, which was
followed by Irish secession, would be an example of this. Although the infringement of
the civil rights of Catholics generally applied throughout the United Kingdom, it did
indeed bear more heavily on Ireland, as opposed to the other constituent elements
(England, Scotland, and Wales), because the Irish sub-unit was predominantly Catholic.
21. See id. at 659-60. The Article suggests economic self interest as a factor in the
demise of Yugoslavia in its pre-secession period. See id. Economic self interest presup-
poses that the sub-unit seeking to secede perceives that its membership in the federa-
tion constitutes a drain on its economic wealth, particularly in the redistributive mecha-
nism common to most federations, The author rightly points out that the actual eco-
nomic benefit from secession (presumably, the lack of wealth redistribution) would
need to be carefully weighed against the costs of secession. See id.
22. See id. at 660-61. The economic exploitation argument is the flip side of the
earlier argument of economic self interest. Whereas economic self interest looks at the
benefits of leaving the federation, economic exploitation looks at the costs of remain-
ing in the federation. Again, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are interesting examples.
23. See id. at 661-63. Sunstein cites the forceful incorporation of Lithuania into the
Soviet Union as an example. See id. However, the issue, then, is not really secession,
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ences.24 While these reasons provide a foundation on which to
lay practical grounds for secession, it may not be, nor does the
author claim it to be, either exhaustive or exclusive. The reasons
why federations fail might also be grouped into economic, politi-
cal, and cultural reasons.
Federations fail economically when they do not provide
equal economic benefits to the component parts of the federa-
tion. This is not to suggest that all sections of the federation
should benefit equally; rather, the benefits should be shared eq-
uitably, or at the very least, they should not be the subject of
significant imbalances between the component parts. Most fed-
erations provide redistributive mechanisms,25 and these can
often be the source of tension, either because they are viewed as
too generous or not generous enough. Either way, when there is
a lack of economic equity within a federation, the federation is
more likely to fail.
Federations also fail for a myriad of political reasons. First,
component parts of the federation may not perceive that they
have adequate representation within the federation's institu-
tions. Some component parts may even feel that others are over-
represented. 6 Second, the relationship between the scope of
the federation and the power of the component parts may give
rise to a perception that there is too little local power and re-
but liberation, as the "federation" is in reality an occupying force. The author disavows
the propriety of secession in this scenario, but fails to deal with the concept that this
actually could be viewed as liberation. See id.
24. See id. at 664-66. The author uses the former State of Czechoslovakia as an
example of cultural and ethnic diversity being used to justify secession. See id. Notably,
the distinction drawn is between the agricultural, devoutly Roman Catholic Slovakia,
and the Czech Republic. Sunstein again argues that such an argument lacks any valid
political morality that would support secession. See id.
25. See Laurent Guihery, An Economic Assessment of German Fiscal Equalization Schemes
since 1970: What Prospects for a Unified Germany ? in I Public Finance and Management
393-419 (2001), available at http://www.spaef.com/PFM-PUB/vln4/vln4/
vI n4 guihery.html.
26. For example, within the United Kingdom, the per capita representation in the
House of Commons is substantially better for Scotland and Wales than it is for England.
Note also that there have been a large number of Prime Ministers from Scotland (Tony
Blair, Ramsay MacDonald, Sir Henry Campbell-Blennerman, and Arthur James Bal-
four) and Wales (David Lloyd George), and even Canada (Andrew Bonar Law, born in
Canada of Scottish parents), although never Ireland! See generally 10 Downing Street,
Prime Ministers in History, at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page123.asp (last
visited Dec. 20, 2003).
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sponsibility. 2' Finally, a component part may resent that control
over its local issues is being delegated to the federation, while
another component part enjoys local autonomy.2 18
Cultural differences are perhaps the most dangerous to the
maintenance of any federation. Unless there is a workable com-
promise that seeks to accommodate cultural differences within
the federation, the federation is not sustainable. One has to take
a wide interpretation of the term "cultural" so as to include relig-
ious, historical, political, and other differences.
Could any of these grounds apply to the current Union?
The answer is yes. There are two ways to examine the Union's
situation: first, by surveying some examples from within the
Union itself, and second by surveying possible difficulties arising
from the applicant States. With respect to the former, the
budget dispute between the United Kingdom and the Union is a
classic example of an economic ground for secession. 9 The
United Kingdom felt that it was contributing substantially in ex-
cess of the benefit it was receiving. After considerable tension,
the United Kingdom and the Union negotiated to deal with this
difficulty. However, the compromise might just as easily have
failed if the ultimate proposal was too far away from either
party's bottom line. In terms of political grounds, recent argu-
ments over the composition of the Commission and the impact
of States not having an automatic right to appoint a commis-
sioner illustrate an issue of political representation within the
Union institutions that has to be resolved.3 ° Culturally, the di-
27. During the 1800s, the dominant issue in the "Irish Question" was not secession,
but Home Rule, meaning greater local responsibility and power with less interference
from Westminster. See OXFORD COMPANION TO IIuSH HISTORY, supra note 8, at 257-58.
Arguably, had Home Rule been conferred on Ireland at that time, secession might
never have happened. When Home Rule was conferred on Ireland in 1914, to take
effect after World War I, it was too little too late. See id. at 258.
28. For example, the so-called "West Lothian" question in the United Kingdom
refers to the following issue: if Scotland has an assembly which has power to legislate
over its local affairs, and if England does not have a similar assembly, but receives legis-
lation from Westminster, then local decisions in England are being made with Scottish
input whereas local Scottish decisions are not subject to English input. See Philip Cow-
ley, Legislatures and Assemblies, in DEVELOPMENTS IN BRISH POLITICS 120-22 (6th rev. ed.
2002) (providing a concise overview of the "West Lothian" question). The argument is
mostly made either to deny regional assemblies or to advocate for an English assembly.
See id. The current devolution provisions maintain the dichotomy, and there is no pro-
vision for an English assembly as yet. See id.
29. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 660-61.
30. See EC/IGC/CONF/3900/96 (Sept. 10, 1996). For a good analysis of institu-
2004]
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vergence between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe,
in particular France and Germany, is quite significant." The re-
lationship between the United States and other Member States is
surely an example of cultural divergence, particularly the his-
toric and political bond between the United Kingdom and the
United States, which is not shared by France or Germany.3 2 In
recent times, the election and inclusion of a far right party into
the national government of Austria33 resulted in an ostracization
of that country within the Union for a substantial period of
time.34 Is this but a few steps away from removing "undesirables"
from power in Austria? If so, is this not the early equivalent of
the potential for secession? 5
Of course, as was pointed out earlier, federations do not
tend to break up over a single event or cause, but instead the
difficulties are composite difficulties. It is a mixture of eco-
nomic, political, and cultural issues that bring such federations
to grief. Perhaps an interesting issue is that of tax competition
within the Union. 6 Economically, politically, and culturally, tax
competition (with the assumed concept of low taxation) is im-
portant to the United Kingdom but significantly less important
to many other countries within the Union. The importance to
tional reform within the Union, see VAUGHNE MILLER, INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE
EU (House of Commons, Research Paper 99/54, 1999), available at http://www.parlia-
ment.uk/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-054.pdf.
31. See Iraq Rift, supra note 2.
32. See David Watt, Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship, in THE "SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP": ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1945, at 1-14 (Wm. Roger Louis &
Hedley Bull eds., 1986) (distinguishing between the particular U.S.-U.K. relationship
and the U.S.-German and U.S.-French relationships).
33. BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN EUROPE, No. 7645, Jan. 31 - Feb. 1, 2000, at 9.
34. See Republic of Austria, EU 14: End of Sanctions Against Austria, NEWS FROM
AUSTRIA, Nr. 18/2000, Sept. 13, 2000, at http://www.austfia.gv.at/aktuell/database/in-
formationen/english/20000913_18.html; Eugene Regan, EU Sanctions Against Austria,
5(6) TBR 290 (2000).
35. Predominantly as a result of the difficulties raised by the Austrian situation,
subsequent Treaty amendments have stressed the need for a commitment to fundamen-
tal democratic values from all States. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 7, art. 6, O.J. C
325/5, at 11-12 (2002), 37 I.L.M. at 69 (ex Article F). See generally Amaryllis Verhoeven,
How Democratic Need European Union Members Be? Some Thoughts After Austria, 23 EUR. L.
REv. 217 (1998).
36. See generally A Package to Tackle Harmful Tax Competition in the European
Union, COM(97)564 Final (Nov. 1997); Towards an Internal Market without Tax Ob-
stacles: A Strategy for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
for their EU-Wide Activities, COM(2001)582 Final (Oct. 2001).
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the United Kingdom is based on all three elements,37 not a sin-
gle element, which thereby makes difficulties in this area more
intractable.
The next issue is whether applicant States might have partic-
ular issues that could give rise to tension and a call for secession.
Let us look at one applicant State: Turkey. 38 Recent elections in
Turkey have given a parliamentary majority to fundamental Is-
lamic political parties, who tend to oppose Western ideology, to
advocate creating a fundamentalist Islamic State, and to favor
making closer contacts with other Muslim States. 9 If Turkey
were a part of the Union, could such a radical change (i.e., from
a secular-type society to a more fundamentalist structure) not
also result in secession by Turkey from the Union?40
Of course it can be argued that Turkey is not yet part of the
37. These elements, as mentioned previously, are cultural, historical, and eco-
nomic.
38. Although, to be fair, Turkey has an ambivalent relationship with the Union
and this is in fact a mutual ambivalence shared by the Union as much as by Turkey.
Nonetheless, Turkey's application for membership is active and recently moved up a
notch. See Press Notice, Foreign Affairs Committee, No. 31, Sess. 2001/2002 (Apr. 29,
2002).
39. See Charles A. Radin, Islamist Party Expected to Gain Power in Turkey, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002, at A6 (outlining the anticipated results of the parliamentary elec-
tion, but also pointing out that the results are always the subject of action by an army
and power structure wedded to Attaturk, the founder of modern Turkey, and his view
of Turkey as a secular State. Not that, of course, such a military coup would ease the
difficulties for the Union, but would instead create a different set of issues).
40. Admittedly this might also pose more difficulties in distinguishing between se-
cession and ejectment. A Member State of the Union signs on to certain fundamental
democratic principles. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 7, art. 6, O.J. C 325/5, at 11-
12 (2002). Article 6 states:
(1) The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States.
(2) The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the consti-
tutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law.
(3) The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.
(4) The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objec-
tives and carry through its policies.
Id. What are the consequences when a Member State then deviates from these princi-
ples? Would the democratic adoption of an Islamic State structure contravene these
principles? Suppose the citizens of a Member State chose of their own free volition to
enact a benign dictatorship? Would the Union response be ejectment or invasion to
restore the Member State to its original position?
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Union and certain question marks hang over whether Turkey
will ever be part of the Union, perhaps for the very reasons out-
lined above.41 However, a similar analysis could be made of
many of the applicant States, particularly of those in the first
wave of new accessions. Combined with the difficulties associ-
ated with maintaining federations at the best of times, the likeli-
hood of the Union having to grapple with the issue of secession
is by no means far-fetched. Quite the contrary, the statistical
odds must be relatively high.
II. IS SECESSION POSSIBLE?
Historically, most federations have had to deal with the issue
of secession at some point in their past. Experience tells us that
results have been mixed, and in some cases the federal experi-
ment is still underway. The secession of the South in the United
States led to a bitter civil war that took many years to overcome.4 2
Quebec's desire to negotiate a different relationship with the
rest of Canada has, and continues to be, a divisive issue within
that federation.43 The U.S.S.R. disappeared as its component
parts ceded and the center imploded through the failure of
communism.4 4 Maintaining federations is not an easy task, nor
is success guaranteed. Sometimes the price to be paid is excep-
tionally high.45
41. See Turkey Entry Would Destroy EU (BBC radio broadcast, Nov. 8, 2002), available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2420697 (reporting comments made by
former President Giscard D'Estaing, currently Chair of the Convention on the Future
of Europe, to the French paper, LE MONDE: "Turkey's capital was not in Europe, 95%
of its population lived outside Europe, it was 'not a European country'"). The BBC
further quotes the former President as saying, "[i]n my opinion [to include Turkey in a
future wave of enlargement] would be the end of Europe." Id. Both Brussels and Tur-
key were quick to downplay the significance of these comments and, despite the electo-
ral success of a fundamental Islamist party in Turkey's election, Turkey was formally put
on the list of accession countries (albeit without a date). Id. Turkey's new administra-
tion remains eager to pursue membership. Id.
42. See generally BROOKS SIMPSON, AMERICA'S CIVIL WAR (1996); E~ic FONER, RECON-
STRUCrION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (2002). One might argue
that the U.S. Civil War was not truly finished until Brown v Board of Education abolished
the separate but equal doctrine in 1954 and the Great Society legislative program of
President Johnson was enacted. See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954); JOHN A. ANDREWS III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE Girr SOCIETY (1999).
43. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Yehuda Blum, Russia Takes Over Soviet Union's Seat at the United Na-
tions, 3 EuR. J. INT'L L. 354 (1992).
45. In the American Civil War, over 600,000 people died. JAMES MCPHERSON, BAT-
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In examining this issue it makes sense to first look at what
the Union provides for in terms of secession, and then to analyze
that in a comparative context to see what lessons can be drawn
for the Union.
A. The Treaty Provisions
There are no treaty provisions concerning withdrawal from
the Union. There are Treaty provisions concerning accession to
the Union,4 6 and there are Treaty provisions relating to issues
where a State is delinquent in its obligations arising under
Union membership,47 but nothing in the Treaty deals with the
issue of secession. The failure to deal with the issue of secession
in drafting the Treaties indicates two possibilities: either the
States accept that secession is not an option, or they hold that
the power to withdraw from any grouping is the ultimate power
of any sovereign State. Under the latter view, joining the Union
could in no way change or alter the State's fundamental right to
withdraw. The lack of a formal procedure for secession merely
reinforces the fact that on this issue, the power of the State re-
mains unfettered.
It is not unusual for newly established federations to lack
provisions regarding the process of secession, but neither is it
common. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly provide for
secession. Nor is there any evidence that the debates leading to
the establishment of the EU actually dealt with the issue, and it is
not clear why this was the case.4" Did the framers consider the
process irreversible? We shall discuss the view of secession seen
TLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 855 (2003). This was a huge number given
the military technology of the time and the lack of a total war concept later introduced
by Germany in World War II. See KLAUS HILDEBRAND, THE THIRD REICH (1984).
46. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 7, art. 49, 0.J. C 325/5, at 31 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 78 (ex. Article 0).
47. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (describing failure to comply with Treaty
obligations); see also STEPHEN WEATHERHILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAw 212-43 (3d ed.
1999).
48. See THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, supra note 15,
at 123-34 (providing a history of the negotiations leading to the establishment of the
free trade area under the EEC). It is probably because of the limitation of the agree-
ment (a common market) that the concept of withdrawal was not seen as significant. See
id. at 130 (suggesting that the focus was on coordination of trade rather than political
connotations).
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nearly one-hundred years later during the Civil War,49 but for
now all we need to be concerned with is that at the time of the
drafting of the U.S. Constitution, the issue of secession was not
addressed. By contrast, the constitutions of the U.S.S.R.50 and
Yugoslavia 5' did contain a secession process, thereby indicating
that the process was not irreversible. There is little to be gained
by conjecture as to why the EU does not deal with secession,
since the absence of a specific process does not answer the ques-
tion of whether succession is possible in any definitive or mean-
ingful way.
Let us return to the two inferences that we can draw from
the silence of the Treaty provisions on secession. If the first in-
ference is correct - that the absence of a process of secession
from the Union indicates that secession is not possible and that
the process is irreversible - then all is complete and the EU has
indeed created a cockroach motel. There is considerable merit
to this approach. The European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty ("ECSC Treaty") was a treaty of limited duration, pre-or-
dained to come to an end.5 2 On the other hand, the European
Economic Treaty ("EEC Treaty") has no such limitation and is
seemingly perpetual in nature.53 Hence, one can cogently argue
that the issue of the length of commitment to the Union was in
the minds of the signatories and that they carefully distinguished
between the ECSC Treaty and the EEC Treaty54 in this regard. It
49. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
50. CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUB-
LICS (U.S.S.R.), 1977, art. 72, reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD
352 (WAilliam Simons ed., 1980) [hereinafter U.S.S.R. CONSTITUTION]. The U.S.S.R.
CONSTITUTION, art. 72 states: "[e]ach union republic retains the right freely to secede
from the U.S.S.R." Id. at 369.
51. The first Basic Principle listed in the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia of Feb. 21, 1974, states, "the [N]ations of Yugoslavia, proceeding
from the right of every [N]ation to self-determination, including the right of secession
.... "CONST. OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA OF FEB. 21, 1974,
reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD, supra note 50, at 428. How-
ever, there was no mechanism established for the process of secession. See id.
52. The ECSC Treaty was to last for fifty years from the date of creation. See Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, art. 97, April 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140.
53. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 7, art. 51, OJ. C 325/5, at 31 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 78 (ex. Article Q) (stating that the "Treaty is concluded for an unlimited
period").
54. The EEC and Euratom Treaties are of indefinite duration; only the ECSC
Treaty was temporally limited.
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follows that silence regarding secession or duration indicates a
permanent transfer of sovereignty in accordance with the terms
of that Treaty. We shall see subsequently that this rationale
forms a strong element of the European Court of Justice's posi-
tion on this topic.55
For the purposes of argument however, let us assume the
second inference, that the absence of any express procedure in-
dicates that the States remain free to exercise their own sover-
eign right to withdraw from the Union at any stage. In many
ways, not merely for the purposes of this Article, but also from a
conservative interpretation of the Treaty documents, this would
appear to be the safer option, for it would indeed be potentially
divisive to remove such a sovereign right through the absence of
an express provision to the contrary, which is what the first infer-
ence requires us to do. If the States had been willing to lose
their supreme rights, presumably they would have expressed this
in forthright and clear language combined with a detailed proce-
dure as to how secession could be achieved.
This argument leads us into an issue of international law:
under the Vienna Convention56 there is an implied right to with-
draw if it can be established that the parties to the Treaty in-
tended for such a right to exist. Thus, there might be an inde-
pendent right to withdraw from the EU only if the withdrawing
State can establish that the parties to the agreement intended a
right of withdrawal upon entering.57 Thus, if we view the Union
treaties as simply an international agreement covered by the Vi-
enna Convention, withdrawal remains with the power of the
State and the State alone.
If the Treaties do not exclude secession, and this approach
appears buttressed by international law, is there anything else in
55. See infra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
56. Vienna Convention on International Treaties, U.N. Doc A/Conf 39/28,
U.KT.S. 58 (1980), 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
57. See Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 56. Article 56 states:
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which
does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denuncia-
tion or withdrawal unless: (a) it is established that the parties intended to ad-
mit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or (b) a right of denuncia-
tion or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to
denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1.
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Union jurisprudence that might so exclude a fundamental State
right, or at the very least provide a mechanism where a Member
State might leave the Union? For that we need to turn to the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ").
B. The Doctrine of Supremacy within the EU
Although there is no specific Treaty provision on the mat-
ter, the doctrine of supremacy, whereby Union law prevails in
any conflict over State law, including State constitutional law, is
well established.58 The doctrine is entirely judicial and arises
from the decision in Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L.59 In that case, the
European Court of Justice held that Union law would prevail
over a subsequently enacted State law. Lacking a simple
supremacy clause similar to that of the U.S. Constitution,6 ° the
court stressed that such a doctrine was needed to ensure that the
objectives of the Treaty were attained, and, in particular, that
Union law would be uniform throughout the States.
It is interesting to examine some of the terminology from
Costa, since it gives a broad insight into the perception of the
ECJ with respect to the nature of the Union that has a dramatic
resonance if juxtaposed with the conceptual issue of secession.
It is worthwhile to extract a considerable section of the judg-
ment, which speaks for itself:
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC
[Union] has created its own legal system which.., became an
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and
which their courts are bound to apply.
By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its
58. See generally KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW
(2001).
59. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
60. U.S. CONsr. art. VI. Art. VI states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. It should be noted that Article 10 of the EC Treaty does impose an obligation on
Member States to ensure the fulfillment of the Treaty objectives and to refrain from
measures jeopardizing these objectives. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community, art. 10, O.J. C 325/33, at 42 (2002), 37 I.L.M. 79, 81
(ex Article 5) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty
of Nice, supra note 7.
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own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity
and capacity of representation on the international plane
and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limita-
tioi of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to
the Community, the Member States have limited their sover-
eign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created
a body of law which binds both their nationals and them-
selves.
It follows that... the law stemming from the Treaty, an inde-
pendent source of law, could not, because of its special and
original nature, be over-ridden by domestic legal provisions,
however, framed, without being deprived of its character as
Community [Union] law and without the legal basis of the
Community itself being called into question.
The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to
the Community [Union] legal system of the rights and obliga-
tions arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limi-
tation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral
act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.65
The jurisprudence developed since then as a result of this
case has been quite dramatic.62 Subsequent rulings have indi-
cated that each State court has the obligation to dis-apply its own
State law in favor of Union law, even where according to the
rules of its own State, such a court would not have the power to
overturn a legislative act.63 Moreover, the doctrine of supremacy
of Union law as envisaged by the court goes further, for it pro-
vides supremacy for the lowliest of Union acts over the highest of
State rules, in particular the constitutions of the various States.6 4
This is clearly the case in effectively amending the unwritten
constitutional structure of the United Kingdom by bestowing
powers of judicial review on courts that have never previously
been accepted to have such power.6" It also operates to modify
the positions of written constitutions of States such as Germany,
Italy, and France, including positions on fundamental human
61. Costa, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 590 (emphasis added).
62. See id.
63. See Int'l Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Fut-
termittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1134.
64. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, Case 106/77,
[1978] E.C.R. 629.
65. See The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., Case
C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. 1-2433, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 1.
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rights.
66
It is important to bear in mind that this is a judicial doc-
trine. Again, the States had the option to introduce an express
supremacy clause in the Treaty but chose not to do so. The
question that must be asked then is once again, why? Again
there are two choices: either 1) the States did not consider the
issue, or 2) they considered the issue and determined either (a)
that supremacy was implicit or (b) that supremacy was not ac-
ceptable. If the States considered the issue and believed it to be
implicit within the Treaty, then the court has merely expressed
what had been unexpressed. If the States did not consider the
issue, then arguably it might be open to the courts to address the
issue on the basis of emergent need for the efficacious operation
of the Union.
If the States viewed supremacy as unacceptable, then the
courts have overstepped their competency. We must dismiss this
interpretation, for if the courts had so overstepped their compe-
tency, surely the States would then have taken the opportunity to
revise the Treaty to expressly overrule Costa67 and the line of ju-
risprudence it spawned. Whilst there is certainly evidence that
the States, and in particular, the State courts were unhappy with
the judicially developed doctrine of supremacy, 6 there was
clearly no groundswell of support to expressly overrule this deci-
sion. In fact, subsequent accessions to the Union were clearly
undertaken on the basis that the doctrine of supremacy was an
integral element of Union membership.
In the case of Ireland, the doctrine is enshrined in the
amendments to its constitution that effectively place Union
membership beyond constitutional challenge.69 Whether such
an amendment is lawful is open to debate. Since the doctrine of
supremacy is judicial in nature, it stems from the Union and not
the States. Acts by the State which appear to give the source of
authority as national rather than Union have effectively been
held to be wrong, since it is not open to the States even when
acting in compliance with the dictates of the Union to give the
appearance that it is the State acting and not the Union.7"
66. See WEATHERHILL, supra note 47, at 443, 447, 449.
67. See Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585.
68. See WEATHERHILL, supra note 47, at 447, 449.
69. See BUNREACHT NA HEIREANN art. 29 (1937).
70. See Variola v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, Case 34/73, [1973]
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This is the crux of the issue: by its very nature, a State that
seeks to cede from the Union would undertake actions which
conflict with Union law, and since Union law is superior to State
law, the State law is overturned. Therefore, secession is impossi-
ble, since the cumulative effect of the lack of an express process
of secession, when coupled with the doctrine of supremacy,
would negate any State act to withdraw from the Union.7'
On a less contentious issue than secession, suppose in the
Irish situation, the citizens of Ireland, desirous to determine the
abortion issue of their own accord, by referendum removed the
relevant article that Union law was immune from constitutional
attack. And let us suppose that 100% of the electorate so voted
in favor. Removing it from the constitution is of no relevance to
the Union, since the basis of supremacy for Union law does not
reside in the Irish Constitution.12 Now let us suppose that a citi-
zen goes to court and successfully seeks a national rule banning
the importation of magazines from the United Kingdom that
contain advertisements for abortion services on demand.7"
Every court in Ireland, from the lowest to the highest, is thus
forced to ignore the expressly stated wishes of the people and
instead to give full force and effect to the Union law under
supremacy. Would it be any different if, for example, the U.K.
Parliament passed a law removing itself from the Union?
The doctrine of supremacy asks the courts of each Member
State for divided loyalties, and in the case of a conflict to see
themselves as courts for the Union. In reality, this is a mass fed-
eralization of the State courts. This is not necessarily a bad
thing, nor is it the purpose of this Article to make arguments for
or against the creation of a federal European State. But the real-
ity is that despite little expression in the agreements between
Member States, a federal jurisdiction has come into being with
clear rules on supremacy that appear on the surface to prevent a
E.C.R. 981, 990-91 (discussing the attempts by Member States to "enact" regulations,
which are direct legislative acts of the Union. The court has held that purporting to
"enact" such regulations gives rise to a false perception that such regulations are not law
until so "enacted" by the Member States, clearly incorrect).
71. See ALTER, supra note 58 (discussing the conditions under which the power of
withdrawal remains with the State under the Vienna Convention).
72. See BUNREACHT NA HEIREANN, supra note 69, art. 29.
73. See Soc'y for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1989] I.R. 753 (Ire.).
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Member State from, at the very least, unilateral departure from
the Union.
One final issue that needs to be dealt with is the following
proposition from the court in Costa:
The integration into the laws of each [M]ember [S]tate of
provisions which derive from the Community [Union] and
more generally the terms and spirit of the Treaty make it im-
possible for the [S] tates, as a corollary, to accord precedence
to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system
accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity.74
This quote may provide some limited comfort and assistance to
those who might suggest that the doctrine of supremacy would
not extend to an act of secession, since such an act would indi-
cate a termination of the reciprocity, which the court indicates is
an essential element. Much depends on the concept of reciproc-
ity and the extent of its application in the development of the
supremacy doctrine outlined by the court. There are a number
of possibilities. First, is the reciprocity that which arises on acces-
sion to the Union, or is it an ongoing concept? If it is the for-
mer, then upon secession the issue of reciprocity has been dealt
with, and any subsequent attempt to deny this reciprocity is fu-
tile. If it is the latter, reciprocity is a continuing, as distinct from
a singular, event; therefore, the supremacy of Union law within
any State should be analyzed at a given time.
Only the latter interpretation would keep the possibility of
the right of secession and Union supremacy co-existing harmo-
niously. A withdrawing State would presumably no longer bene-
fit in a reciprocal context from Union membership and there-
fore, in the absence of this reciprocity, the doctrine of
supremacy would yield as the Member State would put itself
outside of the Union legal order. However, the absurdity of
such an interpretation becomes immediately apparent if we ap-
ply this interpretation to issues other than secession, to the nor-
mal everyday issues of Union activity. If the issue of reciprocity is
not dealt with on accession, it would mean that a State could
deny the supremacy of Union law in a given area by voluntarily
denying itself reciprocal benefits in that area. The court cer-
tainly never intended such to be the case, nor could it, given that
74. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 585, 592 (emphasis
added).
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to do so would be to destroy any reality to a supremacy concept
and instead make a mockery of the doctrine. Supremacy cannot
be defeated simply by voluntary State a-la-carte abandonment of
reciprocity.
It might then be argued that an act of secession cannot be
equated with partial acts of abandonment of reciprocity, but it is
so fundamental in nature that it would stand alone in terms of
context and demonstrate a clear and justifiable breach of the
supremacy doctrine and rationale. But this argument also fails,
since according to the court, accession to the Union carries with
it a permanent limitation of the State's sovereign rights.75 The
court rejects the notion that Union obligations are contingent.
Once .a Member State of the Union, the issue is now a perma-
nent and absolute limitation, for as the court also went on to say:
Wherever the Treaty grants the [S] tates the right to act uni-
laterally, it does this by clear and precise provisions .... Ap-
plications by [M]ember [S]tates for authority to derogate
from the Treaty are subject to a special authorization proce-
dure . . . which would lose its purpose if the [M]ember
[S] tates could renounce their obligations by means of an or-
dinary law. 7 6
C. State Court Reactions
1. England
The reaction to the Court of Justice doctrine of supremacy
by State courts is interesting, particularly that of the English
courts. In traditional English common law, the doctrine of Par-
liamentary supremacy results in the lack of any substantive judi-
cial review.77 Government is not regulated by the restraining
hand of express limits enforced through the judicial branch of
the State. Rather, the legislature enjoys an absolute and unfet-
tered discretion as to what it may legislate. Far from being an
75. See id. at 593.
76. Id. at 585, 593. The term "ordinary law" relates here to a unilaterally enacted
State law, including a constitutional amendment, for the court has made it distinctly
clear that the doctrine of supremacy applies to constitutional laws and principles as well
as normal legislative acts.
77. See Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative
Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United States,
1990 DuKE L.J. 1229 (providing a common law perspective outside of the United King-
dom).
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inheritance from the Crown's limitless power, there is ample evi-
dence that Parliamentary supremacy can owe little to the abso-
lute power of monarch, since in English history, the monarchy
never enjoyed such absolute power. On the contrary, the early
institution of the Magna Carta indicated a period of substantially
limited power.
All this was to change with the removal of the monarchy and
the establishment of the Commonwealth under the Lord Protec-
tor, Oliver Cromwell. During this period, absolute and total
power was conferred upon the people acting through their rep-
resentatives in Parliament. Thus the people, in the shape of Par-
liament, are supreme - a position that the King could only have
dreamed of. Even with the restoration of the monarchy after the
interregnum, the absolute and unfettered power of Parliament
remained. Early judicial indications, prior to the interregnum,
that the courts could overturn laws repugnant to common law
disappeared quickly, and the primacy of the legislature over the
judiciary established itself firmly.78
Bringing the picture forward into modern times, the acces-
sion of the United Kingdom to the Union required an accept-
ance that the Parliament was no longer supreme, but that on the
contrary, Union law was supreme. This was a difficult concept to
both accept and implement. It involved a substantial revision of
constitutional theory. English courts now had the power to ig-
nore the laws of Parliament that were in conflict with Union law.
Although not required for the doctrine of Union supremacy,
which is founded exclusively within the Union and not depen-
dant upon any State measure, the accession of the United King-
dom to the Union is legally enacted in the European Communi-
ties Act 1972 and subsequent legislation. The relevant section
reads as follows:
s.2(1) All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and re-
strictions from time to time created or arising by or under the
Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time to
time provided for by or under the Treaties as in accordance
with the Treaties are without further enactment to be given
legal effect or used in the United Kingdom, shall be recog-
78. See generally FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
LONDON (Herbert A.L. Fisher ed., 1968);JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
(Cambridge University Press 1986) (1960).
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nized and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and fol-
lowed accordingly .... 79
This provision clearly incorporates all Union law and doc-
trines into domestic law within the United Kingdom, including
the doctrine of supremacy, which was established prior to the
statute and of which the Parliament must be deemed to have
notice. This was expressly accepted by the House of Lords in the
Factortames ° case where Lord Bridge of Harwich stated:
If the supremacy of Community [Union] law over the na-
tional law of Member States was not always inherent in the
EEC (now EC) Treaty it was certainly well established in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice long before
the United Kingdom joined the Community [Union] ....
Under the terms of the [European Communities] Act 1972 it
has always been clear that it was the duty of a United King-
dom court, when delivering final judgment, to override any
rule national law found to be in conflict with any directly en-
forceable rule of Community [Union] law .... 81
Clearly the House of Lords accepted the issue of Union
supremacy, but there remains a difficulty: although the Euro-
pean Communities Act of 1972, as amended, can bestow upon
the English courts the power to apply the doctrine of supremacy,
is it a power conferred upon them by the Parliament or the
Union? Lord Bridge's comment indicates that the conferral of
power comes from the statute, not necessarily from the Union.
In McCarthy's,8 2 Lord Denning appears to support such a conclu-
sion as follows:
If the time should come when our Parliament deliberately
passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the Treaty or
any provision in it or intentionally of acting inconsistently
with it and says so in express terms, then I should have
thought that it would be the duty of our courts to follow the
statute of our parliament.
79. European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68 (Eng.).
80. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1 ALL
E.R. 70 (1991) (granting of interim relief-an injunction-against the operation of a
State law which was in conflict with a Union law).
81. Id. at 84.
82. McCarthys Ltd. v. Smith, 3 ALL ER 325 (1979) (holding that interpretation of
equal pay legislation is to be determined based on Union intent, rather than traditional
common law rules of interpretation (plain meaning)).
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This quotation is at clear odds with the supremacy doctrine,
which is not rooted in affirmative actions by the States but deals
with a permanent and irreversible transfer of sovereignty by the
States to the Union based on the new legal order that the States
have created.
Denning's remarks indicate a uniquely British theory: the
Parliament remains supreme, but in enacting the European
Communities Act 1972, it voluntarily limited its supremacy and
ability to confer upon the judiciary the power to review and hold
subsequent Parliamentary legislation as void when in conflict
with Union law. However, since Parliament is supreme, it retains
the right to reverse the European Communities Act 1972 in
whole or in part. Such a reversal would remove the right of the
courts to give supremacy to Union law over State law. Denning's
interpretation favors Parliament, as its transfer of sovereignty
can never be permanent or irreversible due to the concept of
ultimate Parliamentary supremacy. What Parliament has done it
can decide to undo. Of course, this merely states the classical
secessionist difficulty. Denning's logic works well, but funda-
mentally represents a policy choice as to which master the court
serves: State or Union. For many practical reasons, the court is
probably well served by choosing the Parliament.
However, it is also logical to conclude that the Parliament
had made the transfer of sovereignty permanent and irreversi-
ble, for as Lord Bridge indicates, the extent of the doctrine of
supremacy was well known by the time of accession by the
United Kingdom. Hence, Parliament also would have under-
stood that it would be impossible to pass a law withdrawing from
the Union, since on accession the Parliament accepted that no
law inconsistent with Union law would prevail and that secession
is inconsistent with Union law. In fact, after a period of some
400 years, Parliament has been caught in a circular logic that
most closely resembles the cockroach motel analogy. Practically
of course, the courts would have to obey the State Parliament,
butjurisprudentially such an approach lacks logic. If Parliament
had not desired this end result, it would have been open to Par-
liament to expressly state that there was an opt-out clause, de-
claring a right to cede. In such a scenario, the transfer of sover-
eignty would not have been absolute or permanent. However,
by legislatively passing control over to Union law and doctrine,
the extent of the transfer of-Parliamentary sovereignty lies within
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the Union judiciary."3 The Union judiciary has indicated clearly
that the transfer is absolute and permanent. Only a change in
the Union law or Treaties can overturn this transfer.
2. France
Under French constitutional theory, the legislature is su-
preme, and the judiciary is not entitled to criticize the legislature
as this is seen as a breach of the separation of powers theory.84
However, the Conseil Constitutionnel is charged, under the cur-
rent constitution, with testing the constitutional validity of both
legislative acts and treaty commitments. However, Articles 54
and 55 of the French Constitution read as follows:
Art. 54: If the Constitutional Council, on a reference from
the President of the Republic, from the Prime Minister, from
the President of one or the other Assembly, or from sixty dep-
uties or sixty senators, has declared that an international com-
83. Note in particular the so-called Metric Martys case in the Court of Appeals.
Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 50. This case involved the
penalizing of street trades for violating the metrication laws and selling their produce in
imperial measurements (pounds and ounces) which they had been doing for many
years. See id. at 1465. The traders appealed their prosecution to the Court of Appeal.
See id. at 1464-68. Lord Justice Laws for the court, dismissed their appeal and stated,
In my judgment (as will now be clear) the correct analysis of that relationship
involves and requires these following four propositions. (1) All the specific
rights and obligations which EU law creates are by the ECA incorporated into
our domestic law and rank supreme: that is, anything in our substantive law
inconsistent with any of these rights and obligations is abrogated or must be
modified to avoid the inconsistency. This is true even where the inconsistent
municipal provision is contained in primary legislation. (2) The ECA is a con-
stitutional statute: that is, it cannot be impliedly repealed. (3) The truth of
(2) is derived, not from EU law, but purely from the law of England: the
common law recognizes a category of constitutional statutes. (4) The funda-
mental legal basis of the United Kingdom's relationship with the EU rests with
the domestic, not the European, legal powers. In the event, which no doubt
would never happen in the real world, that a European measure was seen to
be repugnant to a fundamental or constitutional right guaranteed by the law
of England, a question would arise whether the general words of the ECA were
sufficient to incorporate the measure and give it overriding effect in domestic
law. But that is very far from this case.
Id. at 1495. The legal issue was refused leave of appeal to the House of Lords and the
parties remained unsure whether an appeal might be more likely to result in the House
of Lords overturning this fundamental right of secession.
84. Under French law, there are two key courts: the Cour de Cassation, dealing with
private disputes and the Conseil d'Etat dealing with public law issues. Neither, however,
has the power to overturn a legislative act. Yet, the constitution of the Fifth Republic
creates a nonjudicial body, the Conseil Constitutionnel, which does have this power.
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mitment contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, au-
thorization to ratify or approve the international commit-
ment in question may be given only after amendment of the
Constitution.
8 5
Art. 55: Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved,
upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, in
regard to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the
other party.
86
In the Jacques Vabre8 7 case, the Cour de Cassation determined
whether a Treaty provision would take precedence over a subse-
quent French legislative act. The Procureur General88 was forth-
right in his exposition of the way that the court should decide:
If you restricted yourselves to deriving from Art. 55 of our
constitution the primacy in the French internal system of
Community law over national law you would be explaining
and justifying that action as regards our country but such rea-
soning would suggest that it is on our Constitution and on it
alone that depends the ranking of Community law in our in-
ternal legal system .... [If you decide this on the basis of
Community law] you will... recognise that the transfer made
by the States from their internal legal order to the Commu-
nity legal order . . . involves a definitive limitation of their
sovereign rights against which a subsequent unilateral act
which is incompatible with the notion of Community cannot
prevail .89
Although finding in accordance with the Procureur General on the
merits of the case, the Cour de Cassation was vague as to the ex-
tent that it was willing to adopt the full and inexorable logic of
his reasoning, although implicit within the reasoning is a clear
acceptance in fact, if not necessarily in theory, of the supremacy
doctrine. Subsequent cases from this court have adopted the
doctrine of supremacy, but have continued to remain vague as to
its full ramifications.
In terms of the Conseil d'Etat, there has been considerable
85. FR. CONST. art. 54.
86. FR. CONST. art. 55.
87. Administration des Douanes v. Societe Cafes Jacques Vabre & J Weigel et Cie
S.A.R.L., [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 336 [hereinafter Jacques Vabre].
88. The Procureur General's role and function is similar to that of the Advocate Gen-
eral in the European Court of Justice, essentially issuing an advisory opinion which the
court takes into account.
89. Jacques Vabre, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. at 363-64.
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reluctance to accept the doctrine of supremacy, and there have
been many instances of express refusal to apply the doctrine.90
In more recent times, however, the Conseil d'Etat has clearly
changed position, 1 and a slow but steady process of accepting
the doctrine of supremacy has begun.9 2 Still, there is uncer-
tainty as to the rationale on which this changed perception is
based.9" On the other hand, in Sarran et Lavacher,9 4 the court, in
dealing with a non-Union treaty, found that under the terms of
the constitution, international treaties were not superior to the
constitution.9 5
Finally, the Conseil Constitutionnel has flexed its muscles.
The role of the Conseil Constitutionnel is to test the validity of leg-
islative acts to determine that they are in accordance with consti-
tutional provisions, and, similarly, pursuant to Articles 54 and
55, whether accession to international treaties requires constitu-
tional modifications. The Conseil Constitutionnel found that
adopting the Treaty of European Union would require amend-
ment to the Constitution. 6 The Constitution has thus been
amended to accommodate deeper integration of the Union and
two new articles have been effectively added:
Art. 88-1: The French Republic participates in the European
Communities and in the European Union, which are com-
posed of States that have chosen freely pursuant to the trea-
ties that have constituted these entities, to exercise certain of
their competencies in common.9 7
Art. 88-2: Subject to reciprocity and in accordance with the
terms of the [Treaty on European Union] France agrees to
the transfer of powers necessary for the establishment of Eu-
ropean economic and monetary union. Subject to the same
90. See Union Democratique du Travail, 1980 L'Actualit Juridique Droit Adminis-
tratif (ADJA) 40 (1979); Sixth Annual Report, O.J. C 330/54 (1989) (describing Societg
Bernard Carantjudgment of the Conseil d'Etat of Apr. 27, 1988).
91. Helene Cohn, The Conseil D'Etat: Continuing Convergence With the Court ofJustice,
16(2) EUR. L. REv. 144 (1991); Pierre Roseren, The Application of Community Law By
French Courts From 1982 to 1993, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 315 (1994).
92. See Maurice Boisdet, Before the Conseil d'Etat, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 3.
93. See Rothmans Int'l France S.A. and Philip Morris France S.A., [1993] 1 C.M.L.R.
253.
94. Sarran et Lavacher, 1998 AJDA 1039 (1998).
95. See id.
96. Re Ratification of the European Union Treaty, [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 345 (Case
No. 92-308 DC before the Conseil Constitutionnel, decided Apr. 9, 1992).
97. This provision resulted from the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel. See id.
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reservation and in accordance with the terms of the [EC
Treaty] as amended by the [Treaty on European Union] the
transfer of powers necessary for the determination of rules
concerning freedom or movement for persons and related
matters may be agreed upon.98
These new provisions, in particular Article 88-2, give an im-
pression of conditional rather than absolute transfer of sover-
eignty. Implicit within the terminology is surely a perception
that sovereignty has not been abandoned but merely loaned.
Moreover the increased recourse to constitutional amendments
by the Conseil Constitutionnel indicates that, at least in the minds
of that body, the transfer of sovereignty occurs through recourse
to constitutional amendment as distinct from being innate to the
Union.
The French courts have still to answer the question as to
what approach they would take in the event that the French leg-
islature was to propose withdrawal from the Union. After an un-
even start, it now seems clear that both the Cour de Cassation and
the Conseil d'Etat have accepted the supremacy doctrine. But the
extent to which it has been accepted remains open to debate.
The Procureur General's admonition99 states the Union position;
however, the French courts have, so far, had no Lord Denning
who will ask the unthinkable: to whom are the French courts
beholden?
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Before investigating whether there is any possible process of
secession in the Union, it might be illustrative to look for com-
parisons in other jurisdictions.0 0 One of the interesting paral-
lels with the European Union is that in the United States, just
like that of the European Union, the States pre-dated the federa-
tion.1 0' This may make the United States a more cogent analogy
98. Decision No. 97-394 of Dec. 31, 1997.
99. See Jacques Vabre, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 336.
100. See generally FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM (Murray Forsyth ed., 1989); FEDER-
ALISM AND THE NEW NATIONS OF AFRICA (David P. Currie ed., 1964); Hiller, Western Sepa-
ratism in Australia and Canada: The Regional Thesis, 5 AUSTL.-CAN. STUD. 39 (1987); GEOF-
FREY SAWER, MODERN FEDERALISM (1976); SECESSION, STATE AND LIBERTY (David Gordon
ed., 1998); R.L. WATrS, NEW FEDERATIONS: EXPERIMENTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 305-12
(1966).
101. Under the Treaty of Paris ending the U.S. War of Independence with Great
Britain, Her Majesty's Government in Article 1 recognizes the thirteen colonies as "free
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than that of Canada, discussed below, since the existence of in-
dependent autonomous States does not predate the establish-
ment of the federation in Canada.10 2 Part III.A will analyze the
U.S. experience, while Part III.B will focus on the Canadian ex-
perience. Part III.C will discuss the applicability of the U.S. and
Canadian experiences to the current European situation.
A. The U.S. Position
There is no express provision contained within the Consti-
tution of the United States that permits secession. In the words
of Abraham Lincoln: "Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in
the fundamental law of all national governments.... [N]o gov-
ernment proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its
own termination. ' °  Of course, this issue would come into
sharp focus during the Civil War and the establishment of the
Confederacy by the seceding southern States. 10 4
Although few legal arguments were made to justify secession
from the United States,10 5 the matter appears to have been de-
finitively resolved in Texas v. White.106 In this case, the court was
sovereign and independent [S]tates." Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art.
1. This may have been a tactic by Great Britain of setting up a conquer and divide
scenario, which partially came true in the Civil War as Great Britain sided, albeit in a
limited way, with the confederacy. But see RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS'
DESIGN 24 (1987) (stating that the original thirteen colonies were not States and there-
fore do not predate the United States).
102. See infra notes 120-43 and accompanying text.
103. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in SE-
LECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 117 (T. Harry Williams ed.,
1943). For Lincoln's own views including his contradictory belief in the right of revolu-
tion, see Thomas J. Pressly, Bullets and Ballots: Lincoln and the "Right of Revolution", 67
AM. HIST. REV. 647, 647-62 (1962); Philip Abbott, The Lincoln Propositions and the Spirit of
Secession, 10 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 103, 103-29 (1996).
104. The States which sought to secede through enacted Ordinances of Secession
were South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia,
Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee. See PETER PARISH, THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
67 (1975) (providing a map of seceding States with the dates they passed secession
ordinances). These Ordinances of Secession were predicated upon a Declaration of
Causes which sought to outline the reason for secession. See infra note 118 and accom-
panying text.
105. For subsequent analysis, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
106. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 700, 724-26 (Chase, C.J. 1869) (holding the
putative secession of Texas from the Union unconstitutional based on an interpretation
of the federal Constitution that constituted a waiver on the part of the States, including
Texas, of the right to secede). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the
Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 501-02, 502 n.68 (1991) (discussing secession); DAVID
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forced to analyze the impact of Texas' act of secession. Texas
sought an injunction in federal court restraining the defendant
from using Texas Indemnity Bonds issued after secession for the
payment of Confederate supplies. 117 The central question was
whether the plaintiff (the State of Texas) had authority to bring
suit against the defendant in a federal court.10 8 Also at issue was
whether Texas was a State of the Union.1 °0 Defendants argued
that Texas' act of secession had terminated its position as a State
of the Union, and until Texas was in compliance with the provi-
sions for Reconstruction, it could take no legal action in the fed-
eral courts. Plaintiff disagreed, arguing that the Union was ef-
fectively indissoluble. On April 15, 1869 the court offered judg-
ment in favor of Texas. In the words of Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase:
By [the Articles of Confederation] the Union was solemnly
declared to "be perpetual." And when these Articles were
found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the
Constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect Union."
It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more
clearly than by these words. What can be indissoluble if a per-
petual Union, made more perfect, is not? 10
Of course this only deals with one element of the argument.
Although it clearly states that the Union is indissoluble, and thus
the Texas Ordinance of Secession without effect,111 it brought
into question whether Texas had ceased to exist. The view of the
majority was that this could not happen, since
the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no means
implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the
right of self government by the States.... IT] he preservation
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-
1888 (1985).
107. White, 74 U.S. at 717-18.
108. Id. at 719.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 725. This use of "perpetual" in the Articles of Confederation provides a
strong basis for an implicit concept of indissolubility referred to by Abraham Lincoln in
his inaugural address. See LINCOLN, supra note 103.
111. The Texas Ordinance of Secession states:
Consideration therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance
of secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citi-
zens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that
ordinance, were absolutely null.
White, 74 U.S. at 726.
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of the States, and the maintenance of the their governments,
are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as
the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of Na-
tional government. The Constitution, in all its provisions,
looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States.' 12
Thus the perpetual existence of both the Union and the compo-
nent States was affirmed.
In many respects the Civil War was a war over conflicting
visions of the role of the federation that were present in the crea-
tion of the U.S. Constitution in 1789: whether the United States
should be an association of States or an entity with a strong cen-
tral national government. 113 The doctrine of States' rights is in-
tegral to the development of federalism in the U.S.114 Indeed, in
the view of States' rights advocate John Calhoun, the Constitu-
tion was a compact derived from the States in their sovereign
capacity, not from the people in a national capacity.1 5
Arguably, it was the national government in Washington's
limited ability to exercise control over the Nation, North and
South, that permitted a climate where divisions with respect to
culture, economics and politics would fester and grow.1 16 Curi-
ously, it was this ineffectiveness of the national government in
enforcing the Fugitive Slave Clause' 1 7 that led the seceding
southern States to favor States' rights over a national interest.
On the other hand, southern States deeply resented any attempt
by the national government to settle the slavery question, as they
viewed slavery as a purely local matter." 8
112. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
113. DAVID G. SMITH, THE CONVENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 35 (1965).
114. ROGER GIBBINS, REGIONALISM: TERRITORIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 20
(1982).
115. Id. at 20 (quoting John Calhoun's statement made in 1831).
116. Id. at 12.
117. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
118. Almost all of the Declarations of Causes by the confederate States complained
about federal breaches of constitutional obligations and limits. See e.g., DECLARATION OF
THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE SECESSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA
FROM THE FEDERAL UNION, reprinted in JOHN MAY & JOAN FAUNT, SOUTH CAROLINA SE-
CEDES 76-81 (1960); MISsISSIPPI, JOURNAL OF THE STATE CONVENTION (E. Barksdale ed.,
1861), available at http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/reasons.html. Texas argued
that the federal government had failed to honor its obligations:
By the disloyalty of the Northern States and their citizens and the imbecility of
the Federal Government, infamous combinations of incendiaries and outlaws
have been permitted in those States and the common territory of Kansas to
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Ultimately, the issue of secession was resolved through force
of arms in the United States, but it seems clear that the absence
of any express right to secede meant that the United States was a
permanent entity. Absent success through force of arms, there
was, and is, no possibility of secession.119 The corresponding
right of the States is their perpetual existence, prohibiting the
federal government from dissolving their existence, but still ena-
bling the federal government to prevent their secession.
B. The Canadian Situation
The issue of secession by Quebec from Canada has a long
and tortured history.12 ° The Canadian experience with seces-
sion stems from the competitive interests of two European pow-
ers: Great Britain and France. France's grip on North America
never proved in any way to be enduring and its first colonial at-
tempt in North America in what is today known as Quebec en-
ded ignominiously in defeat at the hands of the British who took
the city by force of arms in 1759. Although France would never
again re-establish northern colonies in North America, it left be-
hind nearly 60,000 French colonists who were now subjected to
English rule.
The Quebec Act of 1774121 provided, rather surprisingly, a
fairly liberal set of protections for French culture in the newly
acquired British colonies. It provided for the maintenance of
French as the official language,1 22 the adoption of French civil
law (as distinct from the criminal law, which was to be that of the
common law), 12' and protection for religious exercise.' 24 As the
trample upon the federal laws, to war upon the lives and property of Southern
citizens in that territory, and finally, by violence and mob law, to usurp the
possession of the same as exclusively the property of the Northern States.
JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS, 1861, at 61-66 (Ernest Winkler ed.,
1912), available at http://members.aol.com/jfepperson/reasons.html. See also The
United States Civil War Center, Louisiana State University Department of Special Col-
lections, at http://www.cwc.lsu.edu.
119. See James Ostrowski, Was the Union Army's Invasion of the Confederate States a
Lawful Act? An Analysis of President Lincoln's Arguments Against Secession, in SECESSION,
STATE AND LIBERTY, supra note 100, at 155-90; GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG:
THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA (1955).
120. See generally DANIEL LATOUCHE, CANADA AND QUEBEC, PAST AND FUTURE: AN:
ESSAY (1986); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, QUEBEC AND THE CONSTITUTION 1960-1978 (1979).
121. The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c.83 (U.K.).
122. Id. art. VIII.
123. Id. arts. VIII-XI.
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influence of Great Britain extended into Canada, many English
settlers objected to the provisions of the Quebec Act, and in
1791 the Constitutional Act 1 25 split British North America into
Upper and Lower Canada. Upper Canada encompassed the
French speaking settlements whereas Lower Canada encom-
passed the English speaking settlements. Lower Canada
adopted English as their language and law. Unrest against the
British Army in 1837 and the subsequent government report in-
troduced the Union Act of 1840,126 uniting Upper and Lower
Canada and establishing the primacy of English and favoring in
general the English settlers.
In 1867, the time had come to reorganize British interests in
North America, and the British North America Act, 1867 ("BNA
Act") 127 was the outcome. It is important to note a few signifi-
cant differences between the Canadian federation and that of
the United States. First, as already indicated, Canada did not
contain previously existing sovereign States. Quite the contrary,
the Union Act of 1840 created one government over all of Ca-
nada. 12 Thus the design of the Canadian Constitution was not
to conjoin independent States but rather to administratively di-
vide an existing political unit into a federation for practical rea-
sons. Canadian Provinces are truly fictitious entities. Second,
the dynamics of federation were radically different in that one of
the key areas was the need to accommodate differing traditions,
French and English, within a single political entity. In particular
the French minority required considerable safeguards so that its
position, culture, and values would not be swamped in a federa-
tion that would be dominated by English settlers. Finally, the
Canadian experiment was taking place as the American Civil
War was ending. Those establishing a new federation to the
north were keenly aware of the horrific costs of that war, as well
as how perilously close the United States came to extinction in
fighting it. 129
124. Id. arts. V-VI, XV.
125. The Constitution Act, 1791, 31 Geo. 3, c.31 (U.K.).
126. The Union Act, 1840, 4 Vic., c. 35 (U.K-).
127. The British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vic., c.3 (U.K) [hereinafter The
BNA Act].
128. The Union Act, supra note 126, arts. II-III.
129. On the creation of the confederation of Canada, see generally DONALD
CREIGHTON, THE ROAD To CONFEDERATION: THE EMERGENCE OF CANADA: 1863-1867
(1965); CHRISTOPHER MOORE, 1867: How THE FATHERS MADE A DEAL (1997); David
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The British/Canadian analysis of the roots of the American
Civil War was that the national government was not sufficiently
strong when compared to the rights of the component States.13 °
This could be easily remedied in the BNA Act, since the estab-
lishment of autonomous provinces within a federation would be
a conferral of power as distinct from the ceding of power of an
existing State. Thus, the two main dynamics that motivated the
framers of the BNA Act were, first, to provide for strong national
government' and, second, to provide sufficient protection to
the French minority to ensure stability in the one area of the
putative federation that might cause difficulties in the future:
Quebec. 1 2 The BNA Act attempted to do both. First, it con-
ferred extensive power on the national government in Ottawa,
limiting the role of the Provinces and creating a strong national
center of power. 33 Second, it carefully provided for the protec-
tion of the minority French culture, retaining the official posi-
tion of the French language, legal system, and culture in Que-
bec.'33 The design was relatively successful and for many years,
the Canadian federation prospered and more provinces
joined.135
However, the economic development of Quebec did not
match its English-speaking brethren. Quebec's economic devel-
opment remained tied to agriculture and natural resources, and
it failed to develop sufficiently to create a vibrant middle class.
Unfortunately the bulk of middle class in Quebec came from the
English speaking minority for a variety of reasons, not least of
which was the dominance of English commercial entities which
were sufficiently powerful and wealthy to own much of the major
Schneiderman, A. V Dicey, Lord Watson, and the Law of the Canadian Constitution in the late
Nineteenth Century, 16 LAw & HIST. REV. 495 (1998).
130. GiBBINS, supra note 114, at 26-27.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 28. In more recent times, this contention has been disputed and that
there existed a Canadian conversation which would have placed both the Provinces and
the States on a co-equal basis. See G. Blaine Baker, The Province of Post-Confederation
Rights, 45 U. TORONTO L.J. 77 (1995); Jennifer Smith, Canadian Confederation and the
Influence ofAmerican Federalism, 21 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 443 (1988); ROBERT VIPOND, LIBERTY
AND COMMUNITY-. CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1991).
133. The BNA Act, 1867, supra note 127 arts. 140. However, it did not necessarily
create a strong national identity.
134. Id. arts. 92-93, 129, 133.
135. Today, Canada is the world's second largest Nation in terms of geographic
area. See GIBBINS, supra note 114, at 8.
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industries in Quebec. In the 1960s, this disparity of wealth
caused significant resentment, and Quebec began a period of
enforced localization of wealth in the form of nationalization of
industries, huge investment in education at all levels, non-Cana-
dian investment into Quebec, and the equivalent of aggressive
affirmative action programs. While bringing Quebec into line
with the more economically developed provinces of Canada, it
also brought into question the role of the national government,
since these beneficial changes were instigated through local ac-
tion and not national action. In fact, at the request of Quebec,
the Canadian government had changed the BNA Act to reduce
substantially the role of the national government and to
strengthen the power of the provinces.1"6
Thus, by the early 1980s, Canada, having started out with a
view that strong national government was to be preferred over
provincial power, had moved to ceding much national power to
the Provinces. In the case of Quebec, this led to a secessionist
movement that no longer saw any need for a relationship with
the Canadian federation. In 1980, only 40% of the Quebec pop-
ulation voted in favor of a proposal seeking Quebec's withdrawal
from Canada. However, a modified proposal in 1995 that sought
to establish a separate Quebec outside of Canada but with a con-
tinuing economic and political partnership secured a 49.5% ap-
proval in the referendum, perilously close to the 50% plus vote
required for the secession of Quebec.
The closeness of the vote surprised the political establish-
ment, and the issue of secession was brought to the Canadian
Courts by the then national government of Prime Minister Jean
Chretien. 3 7 Under the Canadian Constitution, its Supreme
Court has the power to consider questions on the constitutional-
ity and interpretation of federal or provincial law without an ac-
tual dispute being in existence. These references are not legally
binding but have considerable moral authority and carry the
136. Changes included the withdrawal, or restriction, of National government
from, inter alia, provincial control, foreign relations, equalization payments, and fiscal
control. Eventually the British North America Act was repatriated to Canada as its con-
stitution under the Canada Act 1982, c.lI (U.K.). This Act provided for the patriation
of the Canadian Constitution. See id. All the provinces bar Quebec voted to ratify the
new Constitution.
137. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, available at http://
www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1998/vo12/html/1998scr2-O217.html.
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substantial legal weight of the court. Prime Minister Chretien's
government felt that the potential for unilateral secession by
Quebec had such potential to disrupt public order that it re-
quired a ruling from the Canadian Supreme Court. The Su-
preme Court agreed and heard the case.1 3 8
There were three questions into which the action was to be
framed, each of which is strikingly appropriate in a European
Union context. First, did Quebec have the right to unilateral
secession under the Canadian Constitution?"3 9 Second, did
Quebec have an international right to unilateral secession based
in international law rights of self-determination?1 4 ° Finally, if
there was a conflict between the Canadian Constitution and in-
ternational law, which would take priority?. 4 1
The Canadian Constitution is silent on the issue of provin-
cial secession. 14 2 The court, however, reasoned that if the major-
ity of people in any province sought to secede from the federa-
tion, then as a democratic Nation, this expression of the people
could not be ignored. 43 It would behoove all parties to enter
into negotiations to give effect to the democratically expressed
wishes of the people of that province. Thus, the court recog-
nized an inherent right to secede from the federation based on
the democratic nature of Canada. However, it thought that this
could only occur on two basic conditions: first, the democratic
secession of the province must be favored by a clear majority in
response to a clear question on secession.' 44 Second, secession
could only occur through negotiations involving all of Ca-
nada.1 45 It is worthwhile to pause and look at these elements of
the ruling in more detail.
The court has ruled that a Province needs to establish a
"clear majority" in favor of secession. Unfortunately, the mean-





142. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 132-39 (4th ed. 1997).
143. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 137, paras. 61-69. On the court's
ruling generally, see David Mullan, Quebec Unilateral Secession Reference: "A Ruling that
Will Stand the Test of Time", 9 PuB. L.R. 231 (1998); Rosemary Rayfuse, Reference re seces-
sion of Quebec from Canada: Breaking up is hard to do, 21 U. NEW S. WALiS L.J. 834 (1998).
144. Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 137, paras. 86-87.
145. Id. paras. 88-90.
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who is arguing, a "clear majority" could be 50% plus one or
something significantly more, say 66.6%. It would appear that
the phrase "clear majority" must mean something more than
simply a majority. Certainly the United Kingdom has in deter-
mining constitutional question both at home and in former col-
onies, required more than simple majorities. This was the case
in the Kitts and St. Nevis' referendum 14 6 and in the 1979 refer-
endum on Scottish devolution under Prime Minister James Cal-
laghan, where more voted in favor of Scottish devolution than
against but not enough to meet the number required for devolu-
tion.147
The Court dealt more squarely with the concept of the
"clear question." Here the court held that the 1995 referendum
did not provide a "clear question" to the people of Quebec,
since it did not ask for secession but offered something that Que-
bec was not able to offer - an alternative relationship with Ca-
nada. If secession is to be valid, it must be put to the people
straight: remain in Canada or leave. Only if the people vote by a
clear majority to leave would the issue then be negotiated.
Finally, any issue of secession would require negotiations
with all of Canada. This is predicated on the fact that the seces-
sion of any one province would impact on all the provinces and
the Canadian Nation. The interdependence of the Provinces is,
after nearly 100 years of confederation, now clearly beyond ques-
tion. To leave Canada will require a new accommodation with
the remaining Provinces. Thus even if a clear majority of the
people in a Province approve a clear question of secession from
Canada this would not entitle the Province to unilaterally secede
but simply enable it, and obligate the other Provinces, to negoti-
ate the secession in good faith. The democratic wish to secede
would be a point of departure, not a terminus.
The court then dealt with the issue of whether a Province
would have a unilateral right to secede based on international
law. International law does not deal with the issue of secession.
However, under international law, all peoples have the right to
146. Wayne Norman, Secession and (constitutional) democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND NA-
TIONAL PLURALISM 99 n.7 (Ferran Requejo ed., 2001) (stating that in 1998 a majority but
less than the required two-thirds of voters in Nevis voted to secede).
147. See CHRISTOPHER HARVIE, SCOTLAND AND NATIONALISM: SCOTTISH SOCIETY AND
POLITICS, 1707-PREsENT 105-06 (1999) (stating that 32.85% vote in favor of devolution,
30.78% against, and a 40% vote was required for devolution).
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self-determination, and States are bound to respect that right.
The net effect of the court ruling is that since the Provinces are
represented both at provincial and national level, they did not
constitute a peoples endowed with the right of unilateral self-
determination under the principals of international law. The
court felt that the peoples of the Provinces, and Quebec in par-
ticular, were not an oppressed people within the meaning of in-
ternational law. On the contrary, the people of Quebec were
well represented in the national government at all levels and had
substantial political choices that they could freely exercise. They
were also full participants in the economic, cultural, and social
activities of their Province and the Nation. Based on this analy-
sis, Canadian law in secession was not in conflict with any right
under international law of self-determination that might have
given the people of Quebec the right to unilateral secession.
All sides hailed the result as a victory, with each claiming
vindication. For the separatists there was now a clear right to
secede, in contrast to the situation in the United States. The
Canadian federation was not perpetual. For the federalists, the
right to secede was so restricted that it was the equivalent of a
national decision to re-organize Canada. In truth, both sides are
right. Canada is not perpetual, but its demise is a matter for all
Canadians and not within the sole discretion of any component
part.
C. Application of a Comparative Approach to the European Situation
There are a number of points of comparison that might be
useful to make at this stage. First, like Canada and the United
States, the Union has no express statement on secession. Thus,
the issue of secession was not dealt with at creation of the Union
in Europe, Canada, or the United States. However, the issue of
secession has arisen subsequently in both Canada and the
United States. It would seem highly unlikely that Europe will
avoid a similar issue. Second, the legal ruling in Canada oc-
curred before secession could become a reality, whereas the rul-
ing in the United States came after secession had been defeated
by force of arms. One can wonder how the United States Su-
preme Court would have ruled had it been asked to rule on se-
cession before the Civil War. Arguably the complex nature of
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the American Civil War would not have been resolved by a court
ruling, but it would be an interesting hypothetical.
Finally, the Union is made up of independent sovereign
States, similar to the United States, and completely unlike that of
Canada. The Canadian court decision now surprisingly appears
to confer upon the Provinces the ability to become independent
sovereign States, even though they previously had no such exis-
tence. The position of the United States is that the independent
sovereign States on entering the Union lost the right to return to
their former status. The rulings of the European Court of Jus-
tice, with reference to a new legal order, leave open whether the
European Court of Justice, if seized with the issue of secession,
would consider that the independent existence of the States has
been compromised in a manner similar to that of the United
States or whether it would take the approach of the Canadian
courts.
IV. A CURRENT PROCESS OF SECESSION - MEMBER STATE
UNANIMITY TO SECESSION?
Legally the doctrine of supremacy, allied with the absence
of a specific clause authorizing secession, renders State with-
drawal theoretically impossible. Although, as a practical issue at
the moment, a State determined to withdraw could not be pre-
vented beyond force of arms, and in the absence of a European
army, the Union has no such force of arms to exercise. Never-
theless, there might be a legal means of withdrawal. It would be
open for all the Member States to come to some arrangement
for a voluntary secession of any particular Member State.148
What the Member States have created, they can presumably tear
asunder. But this process raises a number of issues.
First, it would admit that the withdrawing State has no uni-
lateral right to withdraw, but can only do so with the acquies-
cence of the remaining States. This itself indicates a substantial,
and perhaps unforeseen, transfer of State sovereignty within the
existing Union treaties. It also leads to a number of curious per-
mutations. For example, it could mean that the acquiescence of
the Republic of Ireland would be required if the United King-
148. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of OCT
status for Greenland and the consequential secession from the EU).
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dom wished to secede from the Union - a perverse turnaround
on the historical relationship between those two countries.
Second, there is nothing specific within the Treaty as to the
basis on which such acquiescence could be obtained. Would the
States vote through qualified majority or through unanimity?
The better view would be that, similar to accession, a decision to
permit secession would require the unanimous approval of all
the remaining States, thus conferring upon the remaining States
an important veto that could be used to secure concessions in
any agreement of the terms of secession. This would be particu-
larly important with respect to a remaining State that would be
deeply affected by the secession: giving it leverage not merely on
the terms of secession but also in terms of internal compensatory
concessions from the remaining States. A further issue remains
as to what role, if any, the European Parliament would play in
such a scenario. On accession, the assent of the Parliament must
be obtained, and arguably it would need to give its assent to any
secession. At the very least, it would surely require consultation,
but what would be the role of the parliamentarians from the pu-
tative secession State?
For a variety of reasons, it might not be in the interests of
the Union to permit secession, particularly where to do so would
result in the establishment of an independent and non-friendly
dictatorship adjoining the borders of the Union. Or let us sup-
pose that the Member State that proposes to secede contains a
substantial autonomous region within its borders that has made
it very clear that it does not wish to withdraw from the Union.
What would the Union do in such a scenario?
The move towards the establishment of a European army
inserts another complicating factor. The existence of a Euro-
pean army provides the Union with the necessary force of arms
to enforce its version of any possible secession of a Member
State. It is hard to envisage other States authorizing Union
troops to march through the streets of London as an occupying
force, but less difficult to see a Union army re-establishing law
and order in an east European State where the rule of law and
democracy are being threatened by unstable forces hostile to the
Union. Or, even more likely, the European army may be called
to protect those people within a withdrawing State who wish to
remain within the Union, thereby providing the invitation very
often required to justify intervention.
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A. The Role of a European Army
In recent times much public attention and debate has
arisen with respect to the creation of a European Union army. 149
Although it is true to say that the establishment of such an army
along lines similar to that of the United States is some way off,
nonetheless, foundational work does exist and a number of
agreements have been entered into between the States of the
Union. o The concept of a Union army is worthy of study in its
own right and almost any discussion within this Article can pay
little more than lip service to the issues that such a development
poses.
However, it might be worthwhile to briefly mention the role
any such putative Union army might be called upon to under-
take in the future. Suppose that a Member State sought to uni-
laterally secede from the Union and that the other States were
entirely opposed to such secession. Moreover, suppose that the
other States decided that they could not allow a secession that
might result in the creation of a hostile and dangerous regime
deep within the Union. Could the Union army be called upon
to prevent by force of arms such secession?1 51 One would as-
sume that the military forces contributed by the State that is
seeking to secede unilaterally would revert to the control of their
home State.1 52 Could the remaining elements of the Union
army be called upon to intervene by force?
For many, the concept of the Union army forcibly occupy-
149. For general reading on the difficulties in establishing a Union military struc-
ture and army, see CHARLES COGAN, THE THIRD OPnoN: THE EMANCIPATION OF EURO-
PEAN DEFENSE 1989-2000 (2001).
150. In particular, see Consolidated TEU, supra note 7, art. 17, O.J. C 325/5, at 16
(2002), 37 I.L.M. at 71 (ex Article J.7).
151. Another interesting possibility raised by the Austrian situation (see supra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text) would be the use of the European Army to remove
from power an elected government in one of the Member States which sought to im-
pose a system which was in breach of the democratic principles upon which entry to the
Union is based. Suppose State X elects a government whose mandate is to impose a
fascist or communist structure. Certainly the Union could presumably expel such a
State from the Union for breach of its obligations. But could the Union use the army to
remove such a government? This problem is worthy of even further analysis, but time
and space prevent any meaningful discussion here.
152. Although, presumably, some might remain loyal to the Union. Much would
probably depend on how long the Union has existed at the time of the secession, with,
presumably, the longer that the Union has existed, the greater a sense of loyalty from
those in the Union army who might have been born in the State seeking to secede.
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ing a recalcitrant Member State seeking to exercise a right to
secession is far removed from the current concerns of the Union
in the establishment of such a military force. In fact, it is cur-
rently envisaged as dealing with external threats primarily.
Nonetheless, once such an army is created, it may be an attrac-
tive option for internal Union use, particularly where the very
existence of the Union is threatened. It is doubtful that the es-
tablishment of the United States military was ever envisaged
other than for protection from the external threats posed by
countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Spain.
Nonetheless, U.S. military forces were eventually used internally
during the Civil War.
A quick analysis of the existing provisions with respect to
military and defense issues within the Union gives a startling in-
dicator of the possible approach that might be taken by the
Union. Pursuant to Article 11 of the Treaty on European
Union,
[t]he Union shall define and implement a common foreign
and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security
policy, the objectives of which shall be:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, in-
dependence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the
principles of the United Nations Charter . . . ."
Any unilateral secession might be deemed to violate the "inde-
pendence and integrity of the Union." However, this particular
provision relates primarily to foreign policy. Moreover, the an-
cillary defense related provisions of Article 17 confine them-
selves to establishing a Union military capability in the area of
humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peacemaking functions.154
While the Union has begun to develop and deepen its approach
to a common foreign policy, it is only now beginning to turn its
attention to the natural complement to such a common foreign
153, Consolidated TEU, supra note 7, art. 11, O.J. C 325/5, at 13-14 (2002), 37
I.L.M. at 70 (ex. Article J.1) (emphasis added).
154. The provisions require that the Union can establish a force of between 50-
60,000 troops within sixty days and that this force can be sustained for a period of
twelve months. It also obligates the States to create appropriate military command
structures with respect to this force. The due date is 2003. See generally Council Deci-
sion No. 2001/78/CFSP, O.J. L 27/1 (2001) (setting up the Political and Security Com-
mittee); Council Decision No. 2001/79/CFSP, O.J. L 27/4 (2001) (setting up the Mili-
tary Committee of the European Union); Council Decision No. 2001/80/CFSP, O.J. L
27/7 (2001) (setting up the Military Staff of the Union).
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policy: the military might with which to enforce such a policy.
Thus, while at this stage the development of a military compo-
nent is somewhat rudimentary, there is currently much activity
in the defensive sphere. It would be incongruous and illogical if
whatever defensive policy was to emerge were to be at variance
with the more mature development of a common foreign policy.
Arguably, therefore, any defensive structure should have at its
core, the implementation of the common foreign policy, includ-
ing the maintenance of the "integrity of the Union," no matter
from where the threat to such integrity might come from.
B. The European Convention on the Constitutional
Future of the Union
The issue of secession of course must be addressed in any
fundamental reform of the Treaty basis of the Union, and this is
no more readily apparent than in the current European Conven-
tion. The European Council at its meeting in Laeken, estab-
lished a European Convention to investigate the future develop-
ment of the Union, including the drafting of a new European
Constitution. 11 5 The Convention consists of a president, two
vice-presidents, a representative from each of the fifteen Mem-
ber States, thirty representatives from the national parliaments,
sixteen members of the European Parliament, and two members
of the Commission. 156 The Convention is consultative in nature
and it has no binding powers, but the historical tradition within
the Union is for the outcomes of such conventions to be re-
garded highly and, albeit in modified form, acted upon. 57
While most attention is focused on institutional and jurisdic-
tional reform, the issue of withdrawal has not been overlooked
entirely, although a search of the Convention's website illus-
trates merely five submissions on the issue of withdrawal from
the Union, of which only three are pertinent. Each of the sug-
gestions exposes divergent views as to how, if at all, secession
155. Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, Dec. 15, 2001,
available at http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf (last visited Apr. 8,
2003).
156. Potential accession States are also represented albeit only in an observer ca-
pacity.
157. See M. Robert Badinter, Contribution from M. Robert Badinter, alternate member of
the Convention "A European Constitution", CONV 317/02, available at http://regis-
ter.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00317en2.pdf (Sept. 30, 2002).
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would be dealt with. However, it seems clear that all agree that
secession must be dealt with in a revised constitution.
1. The Dashwood Formulation: State Primacy
First, there is the draft constitution proposed by Professor
Dashwood of the United Kingdom, and submitted by the Right
Honorable Mr. Peter Hain. Mr. Hain is Minister for Europe of
the United Kingdom, although it should be noted that the sub-
mission is carefully made so as not to indicate that it carries ei-
ther the support or concurrence of Her Majesty's government.
Contained within the Dashwood draft is Article 27, which states
as follows:
Art. 27(1) Any Member State may withdraw from the Euro-
pean Union. It shall address to the Council its notice of in-
tention to withdraw.
Art. 27(2) The Council, meeting in the composition of Heads
of State or Government and acting by unanimity shall deter-
mine, after consulting the Commission and the European
Parliament, the institutional adjustments to this Treaty that
such withdrawal entails.
Art. 27(3) For the purposes of this article, the Council, meet-
ing in the composition of Heads of State or Government, and
the Commission shall act without taking into account the vote
of the nationals of the withdrawing Member State. The Euro-
pean Parliament shall act without taking into account the po-
sition of the members of Parliament elected in that State. 158
It is clear both from the express wording and from the at-
tached commentary159 that the issue of withdrawal is exclusively
a matter for the State and that no State requires permission to
withdraw - that right being the retained sovereign right of the
Member State. The bulk of the draft article centers on the inter-
nal institutional re-adjustments that would be necessary in such
an event and enables the constitution to be modified through
unanimous action of the remaining Member States acting in
consultation with Parliament. 16
0
158. Peter Hain, Contribution of Mr. P. Hain, member of the Convention-Constitutional
Treaty of the European Union, CONV 345/02, at 46-47, available at http://register.consili
um.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cvOO/00345en2.pdf (Oct. 15, 2002).
159. Id. at 47.
160. Although Dashwood indicates in the commentary that the exact role of the
Parliament might be enhanced, for example requiring its assent to any such modifica-
tions. Id.
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2. The Badinter Formulation: Union Control
Second, in the submission of Robert Badinter, the issue of
secession is dealt with in Article 80 of his draft proposal:
Art. 80: Any Member State may denounce this Treaty and
give notice of its decision to withdraw from the European
Union.
The decision of the Member State shall be made within that
State in accordance with the procedure required for amend-
ment of constitutional provisions of the highest level.
The withdrawal of the State shall not take effect until after
the end of a time-period to be decided by the European
Council.
During this period, the Union and the withdrawing State
shall negotiate an agreement defining the withdrawal proce-
dure and its possible consequences for the interests of the
Union. The withdrawing State shall be responsible for any
loss that may be suffered by the Union due to its withdrawal.
In the absence of any agreement between the withdrawing
State and the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice shall
be seized of the dispute. It shall also hear any actions relating
to the interpretation and execution of withdrawal agree-
ments.
161
The clear emphasis here is that while States retain ultimate
secession powers, they do so only subject to the agreement of the
Union. In this formulation, secession is simply not a matter of
internal reorganization, but the process and impact of secession
becomes a matter of substance for the Union, dealt with by ei-
ther agreement or court imposed rulings. In many ways, the
Badinter formulation is more realistic than the State primacy
concept of Dashwood, for the Badinter formulation expressly
recognizes the practical reality that secession would have a signif-
icant impact on the Union and that such a move by any Member
State would require detailed negotiation and agreement. It also
provides for judicial adjudication where negotiation fails to pro-
duce agreement. At all stages in the process, therefore, the sov-
ereign right of the State to secede from the Union remains lim-
ited and controlled by the Union constitution, in sharp contrast
to the State primacy model.
Interestingly, the proposal also provides for compensation
161. Badinter, supra note 157, at 50.
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for any loss arising to the Union, although it is unclear what this
loss would cover or how it would be calculated. Presumably it
includes repayment of Union subsidies, such as agricultural pay-
ments and investments in infrastructure. It is unclear whether
the Union would seek recoupment of all losses from the date of
accession of the withdrawing Member State. Another issue is
whether repayment should be balanced by contributions re-
ceived from the Member State during its period of membership.
What about future losses to the Union and the remaining mem-
bers? If the Badinter formulation were to be adopted, these is-
sues would prove difficult to surmount. While the rationale be-
hind the Badinter formulation - that State secession is a joint
matter for the State and the Union - might survive, the simplis-
tic notion of damages to be paid by the withdrawing State would
require substantial elaboration.
3. The Federal Formulation: No Secession
In postulating potential models,1 6 2 Lamassoure indicates, al-
beit in a tangential remark, that in a federal reorganization of
the Union, the rule would be once a member always a mem-
ber.' 63 However, this federal approach, not merely in the sphere
of secession but more globally, is rejected,16 4 as is the confederal
model. 6 ' Instead, reliance is placed on a hybrid version. Ulti-
mately, Lamassoure settles on a "community" model, which
162. See generally Alain Lamassoure, The European Union: Four Possible Models,
CONV 235/02, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cvO0/
00235en2.pdf (Sept. 3, 2002).
163. See id. at 6. However, it is not strictly true to say that a federal form of govern-
ment automatically has to prohibit secession. Of course, permitting secession must be
seen as a last resort if the political will to work through problems is to be sufficiently
focused.
164. See id. at 8. The federal model is rejected as being one unlikely to be accept-
able to the people of Europe and a step too large for Nation States. Essentially, the
argument is that while the people of Europe are supportive of the component parts of
the Union, they may demur from a model that would present these component parts as
a whole. The logic is somewhat flawed, and in reality reflects a fact that Mr. Lamassoure
tends to gloss over, namely, there is sharply divided opinion within the European citi-
zenry as to the benefits of Europe, even when viewed in its component elements. Id. See
also WHEARE, supra note 19, at 85-87.
165. See Lamassoure, supra note 162, at 3-6. The confederal model is rejected as
being unworkable as the Union enlarges. The argument is that the confederal model
would greatly exacerbate the current difficulties of the Union as the number of States
increased; in particular it would enlarge the democratic deficit, reduce accountability,
heighten conflict between States, and so forth.
SECESSION FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
would be one where "[t]he right to withdrawal is enshrined in
the constitution. It is [however] subject to strict and deterrent
conditions, but every State is acknowledged to hold that right at
all times."'
16 6
Returning to the issue of a federal constitutional structure
for the Union, and the implication that withdrawal is not possi-
ble in such a structure, this presents a real possibility that the
Union could prohibit withdrawal. It seems perfectly consistent
that, if on acceding to the Union, a State is fully aware that it
cannot withdraw, there is nothing wrong to holding such a State
to its bargain. If the Union subsequently decided that it, as a
whole, did not wish to prevent the secession of a Member
State, 67 then it could agree to that in bilateral negotiations with
the State which is withdrawing, without necessarily establishing
either a precedent or procedure for withdrawal.168
4. The Early Convention Formulation: Now Is Not the Time!
In the early submission of the draft constitutional frame-
work, withdrawal was dealt with in Article 46. This stated:
This article would mention the possibility of establishing a
procedure for voluntary withdrawal from the Union by deci-
sion of a Member State, and the institutional consequences of
such withdrawal.' 69
The wording of this particular Article is ambiguous to say the
least. It is particularly ambiguous when viewed in light of the
preceding Articles concerning accession to and suspension of
Union membership.17 0 In both accession and suspension, the
term used is "establishes." In juxtaposition, the phrase "would
166. Id. at 12. This conception would be much closer to the Badinter formulation.
See Badinter, supra note 157.
167. It does not automatically follow that the secession of part of the federation
would automatically lead to the demise of the entire Union. Although not a perfect
analogy by any stretch of the imagination, the departure of Ireland (at least of the
twenty-six southern counties) did not lead, as of yet, to the demise of the United King-
dom and albeit pressed by force, the Westminster Parliament acceded to the secession
of Ireland, despite there being no "process" established for leaving the Union, save
through an Act of Parliament.
168. Note the Irish Free State Act 1921 does not provide for a process of secession
from the Union for either Scotland or Wales.
169. The European Convention, Preliminmy Draft Constitutional Treaty, art. 46,
CONV 369/02 (Oct. 28, 2002).
170. See id., arts. 44 and 45 respectively.
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mention the possibility of establishing" gives rise to some con-
cern. Under the constitutional submission, the need for a spe-
cific Article of secession is not clear. Moreover, even if such an
Article should be included in the constitution, it was simply on
the basis of mention and possibility. In other words, any possible
secession Article would impose on the States a possible obliga-
tion of establishing some sort of secession process. How likely
would this be prior to an actual secession? If history is anything
to go by, and Union history in particular, procrastination would
be the order of the day. Moreover, it defies logical sense as to
why, in the midst of the largest reform ever suggested for the
Union, an issue as important as secession should not be settled
in conjunction with the other major reforms.
5. The Revised Draft Secession Provisions under the Proposed
European Constitution
In a stunning turnaround, Article 46 has been heavily re-
vised. Simply put, it would now permit any Member State to "de-
cide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with
its own constitutional requirements.""17  Procedurally, such a
State would have to formally notify the European Council of its
decision and then enter into negotiations for the arrangements
to withdraw, which would include a framework for the future
relationship between the Union and the Member State. This
would require approval by a qualified majority of the Council
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 72
Somewhat curiously, it then proceeds to indicate that in any
event, withdrawal will occur not later than two years following
the State notification unless extended by agreement between the
Member State and the European Council.17 This looks star-
tlingly like an outright victory for the British proposal which of-
fered unilateral secession from the Union. Although a two year
period would apply whereby the practical concerns of secession
could be negotiated, each State would retain the sovereignty to
secede at its own discretion.
On reflection, the proposal now before Europe is a major
171. See Draft Convention 724/03, art. 1-59(1), ann. 2.
172. Id. at art. 1-59(2) (declaring that a State seeking to withdraw can take no part
in the Council or European Council discussion or decisions concerning it).
173. Id. at art. 1-59(3).
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disappointment in that it lacks the clarity of the British proposal.
Under the British proposal discussed earlier, the issue of with-
drawal required those left behind to come to an agreement to
reorganize Union affairs to reflect the new reality. The current
proposal, however, suggests differently. It has proposed a system
that is vague, uncertain and carelessly worded. A quick analysis
of the proposal reveals a number of significant flaws.
First, and most obvious, is the requirement for a negotiated
withdrawal by the Member State. This makes sense if the seces-
sion can only legally proceed with the agreement of the Union.
However, the Article proposes a two-year deadline at which
point, agreement or no agreement, the secession operates.
What benefit is there to any negotiation if failure to act on either
side within two years will result ultimately in secession?
Second, during the two-year period, it appears as if the with-
drawing State remains subject to both the burdens and benefits
of the Union. Thus, it can still participate in the decision mak-
ing process, making decisions as part of a group from which it is
destined to leave. It could, for example, slow decisions that
would benefit the members of the Union but be adverse to its
own new independent status. Third, it excludes representatives
of the withdrawing State from participating in Council decisions,
but no mention is made of Members of the European Parlia-
ment from the withdrawing State. Are they to be excluded in
the consent of the European Parliament?
Finally, this proposed two-year deadline means that a Mem-
ber State could negotiate its withdrawal from the Union, without
actually having withdrawn. What would occur then if that Mem-
ber State withdrew its withdrawal before the two-year deadline?
It would not have left the Union, so it would not have to re-apply
for membership. In fact, the cost to the putative withdrawing
State would be inconsequential. Withdrawal should either be
unilaterally immediate or multilateral only. In proposing unilat-
erally delayed withdrawal, the Convention conspires to hand
each Member State a power more significant, and more divisive,
than that of the old Luxembourg Accords. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that State X has a strong disagreement with respect to a pro-
posal that has the support of the rest of the Union. State X
would be well advised to indicate to the Council that it intends to
withdraw from the Union and start the negotiations. These ne-
gotiations would require considerable effort on the part of the
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Union, yet at any stage the withdrawing State could withdraw the
withdrawal, provided it does so before two years have elapsed.
Worse still, it might be able to persuade the European Council
to extend this period, but for how long? Six months? Six years?
Six decades?
One alternative interpretation of the article is that once no-
tification to withdraw has been lodged, withdrawal happens au-
tomatically after two years unless the European Council agrees
to extend this period and, consequently, that there is no right to
withdraw the withdrawal notice. Such an interpretation, it is sug-
gested, might meet the objection that the provision could be
used as a negotiating tactic by a Member State. This analysis is
flawed in two possible ways. First, as a matter of common sense,
it should be open to a Member State to change its mind within
the two-year period. If Union law applies in full during this pe-
riod, what harm has been done by allowing the State to change
its mind? None. It would be perverse not to allow for this. If
there is no implied right to withdraw the withdrawal then argua-
bly one should be expressly included. Failing that it would re-
quire an interpretation of the Article by the Court ofJustice, and
who could envisage the court denying an existing member the
right to change their mind and remain in the Union? In any
event, if it were to be outside the scope of the provision, the
Council could use its power to extend the two-year deadline in-
definitely.
Second, and more importantly, on a practical level, suppose
Germany felt sufficiently upset over a single issue that it notified
that it would seek withdrawal from the Union. The negotiations
begin, but Germany is only concerned with respect to the single
issue on which it is isolated within the Union, and simply refuses
to enter into meaningful discussions about secession proper. It
becomes clear that Germany would drop secession if the particu-
lar proposal it favors is adopted. Practically and logically, how
would the Member States choose between losing Germany as a
member of the Union and yielding on this one issue? Suppose
that the rest of the Union stood strong, and Germany indicated
that it wished to remain a member of the Union. Would the
Union then seek a narrow interpretation of this Article so as to
close the door to Germany's dropping of the withdrawal notifica-
tion? Unlikely. Although if one was to switch Germany with say,
Hungary, then the answer would undoubtedly be different. The
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effect of withdrawal on Germany would be large to the Union,
small to Germany, but vice-versa for Hungary.
Thus, almost any interpretation of this Article would be ei-
ther (a) a negotiating tactic used by all States or (b) on a narrow
interpretation, a charter for the larger States to yet again exer-
cise more power over the smaller States through the threat of a-
la-carte secession. No formal notification would ever need to be
lodged. Whispered comments would be enough to obtain just
enough compliance to the larger State's view.
The Convention's current proposals for the new Constitu-
tion are embarrassing and overly generous to larger States for
which withdrawal could be more readily and credibly used as a
tactic to bully the Union. France, when concerned about the
issue of farm prices, used the empty chair policy that led to the
Luxembourg Accords. What would make the use of this Article
any less likely by a larger State? And what small State could resist
the threat of departure by a larger State on whose markets it is
dependant?
CONCLUSION
Perhaps Abraham Lincoln put it best when he said that "no
government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its
own termination."' 74  However, Lincoln's imperative is not
merely factually incorrect,' 7 5 it needs also to be read in the light
of the circumstances of the time it was uttered. Sunstein argues
that it is constitutionally unsound to expressly permit secession
in any shape or form and that if the federation is to work, opt
out clauses tend to unnecessarily weaken the enduring nature of
the federation.' 76 Most of these arguments are, however, based
on an analysis of Eastern Europe soon after the fall of commu-
nism.
There are very clear choices facing the Union. The first op-
tion would be to permit absolute secession rights to the individ-
ual States. This view has merit in giving ascendancy to State sov-
ereignty and power. However, it creates a looser association of
States, which in all likelihood could not long endure. A disgrun-
174. LINCOLN, supra note 103, at 117.
175. See U.S.S.R. Constitution, supra note 50. Although to be fair, Lincoln does
predate this example by some years.
176. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 666-70.
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tied State could use secession as a tactic to secure advantage
within the Union, leading to instability. However, there are lim-
its to this logic. A Member State could only really use the threat
of departure for a major issue, otherwise it would run the risk of
having its bluff called. In that way, the issue of secession be-
comes like a game of poker. To threaten withdrawal, the State
must intend to act, and must so act, on the threat if it does not
get its own way. Should the Member State make the threat and
the others call its bluff, any future benefit of the threat is severely
diminished. Game theory would indicate that with such high
stakes, Member States will, through logical analysis and rational
action, limit the threat only to such situations where the issue is
so great that withdrawal is a certainty. Thus contrary to a per-
ceived fear, probably no State would make the threat to with-
draw unless it (a) felt that its national interest was threatened to
a significant extent and (b) intended to act upon the threat.
However, one can be certain of neither outcome and an absolu-
tist right to secede certainly has the potential for a looser and
more temporary arrangement.
The second option would be to prohibit secession entirely.
This has a number of advantages in terms of creating an endur-
ing entity with a conscious realization of perpetual existence. It
would remove some of the fears that individual States might ab-
dicate their position when the going got tough. However, such a
proposal would need to be addressed clearly and directly, for it
would radically alter the concept of State sovereignty within the
Union. The effect of such a proposal would forever commingle
the State's right to exist with the imperative of the Union's exis-
tence. While this is clearly the best option in terms of the worka-
ble nature of the Union, it may for many States be a step too far
at this stage.
Finally, it may be that the submission from the Convention
adopts one possible federal approach more suited to the Euro-
pean experiment, 177 expressly keeping open the primacy of the
States to secede from the Union, but permitting this only on
terms and conditions to be agreed with the Union and without
necessarily seeking to establish a "one size fits all" process of se-
cession. There may be sensible grounds for this, since with an
177. See id. at 643-46. Sunstein's analysis is confined to individual east European
States. See id.
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enlarged Union, the different reasons for secession may be so
varied, and the Union interest impossible to prejudge, that every
secession should be viewed as a unique event to be determined
by a unique process. It would retain the sovereign rights of the
States to an independent existence but de facto limit the ability
of a State to secede, as to do so would require co-operation from
the Union. It would prevent secession from being the instant
response to State difficulties with the Union, which might result
from an absolute right of secession.
Ultimately, no matter how a future Union constitution deals
with this, if feelings are sufficiently strong and if the interests
affected are sufficiently great, then force of arms will most likely
be required to resolve disputes. However, one of the advantages
of discussing theoretical models of secession at the stage of draft-
ing a putative Constitution is that it forces the States to truly ex-
amine what it is they are actually creating. The degree to which
secession is controlled tells us much about whether the Union is
simply an association of States or a true federal Union. And
resolving that now may reduce the likelihood of potential use of
force later. Certainly ignoring the issue will more likely exacer-
bate such potential.
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